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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose and Problems 
The writing of the philosopher, Samuel Alexander, in-
dicates that he retained a vital interest in the subject of 
value during his academic life. As author and teacher he 
spent much of his time in the pursuit of truth, beauty and 
1 goodness. His greatest contribution to philosophy was 
made through writing. In articles and books he shows a con-
tinuous concern with the problems of definition and explan-
ation of value. 
The purpose of this investigation is to find and 
present the important concepts of Alexander's value theory, 
to discover how he developed these concepts, and to deter-
mine how well he treated the subject. 
For any discussion of value the following problems 
are fundamental. How are. values known and how does this 
knowledge of value differ from knowledge of facts? Is there 
objective reference for value, or are values fashioned by 
the mind, or does the mind make valuable what is given in 
the objective world? 
1. DUring his productive years, Samuel Alexander was pro-
fessor of philosophy at the University of Manchester in 
England. 
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What are the necessary conditions of value experience? Why 
are values precious and for what order of being are they 
real? To deal with these problems the philosophical methods 
of epistemology and metaphysics must be used. 
The task at hand is to find how Alexander answered 
the problems of value in his formulation of the ways of 
knowing and characteristics of being. 
2. Previous Literature and 
Source Material 
The subject of this thesis has been previously 
treated from three different perspectives. John w. McCarthy, 
in The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander examined the views of 
Alexander from the sympathetic position of an emergent evo-
lutionist. It was his intent to clarify the given value 
theory by enlargement and connection of basic points. Milton 
R. Konvitz has written a review and criticism of Alexander's 
value theory with a primary interest in theory of knowledge 
in his book, On The Nature of Value. J. R. Cresswell, in 
an unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Position of Value 
in the Philosophical System of Samuel Alexander, attacked 
Alexander's value theory from an opposing metaphysical posi-
tion. These expositions have been useful for the clarifica-
tion of the value theory in question and for the revealing 
of problems of content and method. 
Alexander always intended that his writing should 
provoke comment and add to the philosophical ferment of his 
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time. What he wrote was important enough to evoke criticism 
.from many of his contemporaries. Articles on the major points 
of his philosophy can be found in ~ne lead~ng pn~losopn~cal 
joun1als. Tnese art~cles concerned with the problems of 
value have been helpful as secondary source material. 
Most important for this thesis are these writings of 
Alexander that either disclose or are related to his theory 
of value. These articles and books, contained in the attached 
bibliography, were published during a period of forty-four 
years. The limits of this period are marked by the publication 
of two books. The first, Moral Order and Progress, appeared 
in 1889. His last writing of significance, Beauty and 
Other Forms of Value, was published in 1933, five years be-
fore his death. 
At a time midway between these dates, Alexander was 
invited to give the Gifford Lectures, which were published 
in 1920 in the two-volume work, Space, Time, and Deity. 
This systemat±·c treatise represents the best effort of the 
great philosopher as analyst and synthesist. One of his 
objectives was to establish the position of value within a 
naturalistic system. To this task an eighty-page division 
of the work was devoted. Here, as nearly as possible, the 
finished thinking of the author on this subject can be found. 
1 
The fundamentals of his value theory are found in STD in 
concise and interrelated form. 
1. The abbreviation STD is used for Space, Time, and Deity. 
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Alexander wrote articles about value and published the 
book Beauty and Other Forms of Value after he presented his 
metaphysics, STD. These writings are elaborations of his 
value theory; they do not indicate any basic change of views 
from those held in STD. 
3. Method of Investigation 
As previously indicated, to answer the problems that 
arise with any value theory, the way of knowing and the char-
acteristics of being must be examined. If any part of exper-
ience is marked by the claim of more worth, it must be deter-
mined how it is known to be so and under what conditions. 
Chapter Two of the thesis is an exposition and ex-
amination of Alexander's basic concepts of knowing and being 
which are related to his value theory. His theory of value 
is dependent upon these concepts for they answer the ques-
tions, how can value be known and for what order of being is 
value real? 
The intent of Chapter Three will be to present and 
clarify the significant points of Alexander's value theory. 
In Chapter Four the key criticisms of McCarthy, 
Cresswell, and Konvitz will be given for the purpose of 
cross-examination. These provide an analysis of Alexander's 
theory from different perspectives. 
Chapter Five is a critical summary of Alexander's 
value theory in which evaluative conclusions are given. 
The working method to be pursued through the following 
4 
chapters will conform to the pattern, presentation, analysis, 
and criticism. The ideal of objective treatment will be the 
constant intent, weighing points against themselves to see if 
they cohere within Alexander's system and with the facts of 
experience. A purely negative criticism, having no rightful 
place in philosophical writing, will be eliminated as coherent 
contributions to value theory are recognized. 
5 
CHAPTER II 
MAJOR APPROACHES TO THE SUBJECT 
OF VALUE IN ALEXANDER'S THOUGHT 
l. A Starting Point 
A dissertation on Ethics for which Alexander was 
awarded the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in 1887 gave him 
an entrance to the philosophical world. The dissertation 
became the basis for a systematic work on ethics which was 
published in 1889 under the title, Moral Order and Progress. 
Though it is contended that the author later changed many 
of his views, the work represented an interest in and under-
standing of the good life as well as a scientific search 
for truth. 
Alexander's first approach to value was by way of 
moral concepts. He found the mark of value in this area 
because, as he states, "ethics can attend exclusively to the 
quality or content of the agent's mind." 1 The judgment of 
this content he held to be basic to the idea of value. 
Alexander drew a . distinction between the value of 
willed action and mere instinctive action by stating that 
"value is based on the quality of the act and that alone."2 
1. MOP, 69. All footnote references are to Alexander's 
works unless otherwise indicated. 
2. MOP, 71. The close connection between quality and value 
which is elaborated in his full-grown theory may be 
noted here. 
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By holding this dependence of value on quality of acts a num-
ber of questions are introduced which brings Alexander well 
into the problem of value. 
It is necessary that Alexander define what he means 
by quality if moral value depends on quality of acts. 1 He 
must answer these questions. 1) Is the quality of acts, 
the conditional requirement for moral value, in any way 
unique? If so, how does this quality differ from basic 
qualities? If not, how is moral value recognized? 2) How are 
the qualities acts of agents to be regarded within a society 
of agents? 3) Are the conditions for value bearing quality 
found entirely within the natural world? 
These questions are considered directly in an arti-
cle, "The Idea of Value," published in Mind in 1B92. In this 
article the value of moral action is specifically treated. 
Alexander states that "moral judgment is nothing but 
a sentiment which arises when an action comes into friendly 
2 
or hostile contact with a mass of sentiments." The term 
sentiment carries a broad meaning. A careful definition of 
the term at this point would be a digression. The common 
definition of sentiment as type of regard or feeling response 
is assumed for this analysis. With this meaning of sentiment 
in mind, the statement above seems to give a natural explana-
tion for.moral value. The value of moral judgment is found 
1. His theory of quality is given in STD. 
2. Art. ( 1892), 41. 
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in the given situation dependent upon sentiments, the com-
mon human feeling for anything. 
In basing moral value upon sentiment Alexander has, 
in a sense, reduced the uniqueness of moral worth. He must, 
therefore, show the distinguishing mark of moral value. 
This he does in the following statement. 
A value, a certain standard of estimation, is 
determined by each step in the history of mo-
rality through which good is distinguished 
from bad. As the successful organisms in the 
battle of life are fit, the successful ideals 
in human history are valuable.l 
That which succeeds is that which Alexander claims 
to be the valuable. But success is an illusive term. Sue-
cess is measured by different standards. For one person, to 
succeed is to become wealthy. For another, success is mea-
sured in terms of creative influence. The successful for the 
evolutionary formula is that which survives. 
Alexander's reason for claiming the successful ideal 
as the valuable is because we cannot go beyond the moral 
situation.2 In other words, what is happening is the only 
experience we can appraise. Shifting standards make it im-
possible for a person to say he is doing the good or right 
which will be considered as such for all time. 
In searching for a natural explanation for value ex-
perience, Alexander kept his theory in close contact with 
the facts of experience. If moral values are unique, he 
1. 
2. 
Art. ~1892), 50. 
Art. 1892), 50. 
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would say, it is not because of a relation between acts and 
a realm of ideals with a status of their own. Moral values 
are such because of successful moral ideals; that which is 
succeeding is valued. 
2. A Quest for Truth 
Another approach to the subject of value in Alexan-
der's philosophy is found in his insistent objective treat-
ment of fact and value. However, he points out both liKeness 
and difference between the two. "Value is only a particular 
kind of fact, a fact of a higher order, but essentially a 
thing natural, and in direct continuity with all other 
1 facts." 
Alexander assumed the perspective of the naturalist 
from the start. He was sure that value could be explalued 
best in terms of the natural order of things and events. 
Since values and facts are present in the same world, he 
thought, they could be known and explained similarly. 
The idealistic position with which Alexander disagreed 
was concerned with ideals. For example, the Platonic idealist 
conceives of a world of ideals or patterns of things and acts 
as they ought to be. Human objects of beauty or moral acts 
are copies of these ideals; as acts or thoughts approach the 
likeness of the ideals value is achieved. For the idealist, 
value is unique because of the relation of human activity 
to the realm of the ideal. 
1. Art. (1892), 36. 
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• 
For the naturalist, value is unique only because it· 
is a fact of a higher order within the same world with facts. 
The naturalist can attempt to solve the problems of value 
theory with a method similar to that which he uses to inves-
tigate the problems of science. The naturalist can use the 
scientific approach to the solution of his problems, and 
being scientific the naturalist reasons that a more careful 
analysis of values or facts is possible because of the ab-
sence of personal bias.l 
Alexander was thoroughly acquainted with scientific 
discipline. He studied psychology to acquire knowledge of 
the latest developments of that science. He revised his 
teaching lectures by mixing philosophy with biology or experi-
mental psychology.2 He assumed a scientific habit of mind 
because it conformed to a standard of truth most free from 
appeals to prejudice. 
For Alexander, the search for truth in any area was 
most fruitful if evidence could be directly examined. He 
found adequate evidence for classifying a part of the natural 
world and a part of experience as valuable. He assumed that 
value was similar to fact and was, therefore, knowable and 
explainable. 
3. An Epistemic Realism 
If knowledge of value is admitted to the field of 
1. The scientist works with the ideal in mind that personal 
bias must not be allowed to interfere with factual evi-
dence. 
2. Laird, PLP, 14. 
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knowledge, then before examining any value theory a basic 
question must be asked. The question is, how is knowledge 
possible or how can anything be known? The philosophical 
position of Alexander in answering the problems of knowledge 
was that of a realist. 
An explanation of what Alexander himself considered 
to be ~ realism he gave in a paper, "The Basis of Realism, 11 
which he read to the British Academy. John Laird, a contem-
porary and able student of Alexander, considered this paper 
to be the best account he ever gave of the epistemic realism 
with which he began.l 
The main points of the paper can be summarized as 
follows: 1) The temper of realism is to de-anthropomorphize; 
that is, to order mind and man to their proper place among 
finite things.2 2) In compresence enjoyed mental acts con-
template non-mental things with resulting cognition. 3) The 
windows of things are variously glazed so that, though each 
thing is in active relation with the universe, it only sees 
the universe in the characters of things it is able to see, 
which its glass transmits.3 
This presentation of Alexander's early realistic views 
will serve as an introduction to a more careful analysis and 
1. Laird, PLP, 59. 
2. This is a reaction of Alexander and the "New Realists" 
of his day against the idealists (A. C. Bradley, T. H. 
Green, Bosanquet) who were accused of identifying know-
ing with the knower. 
3. Laird, PLP, 58, 59, 60. 
ll 
explanation of points of his knowledge theory as found in 
STD. A full treatment of his epistemology is net attempted. 
Only the points related to his value theory will be con-
sidered. 
1.. The Cognitive Relation 
The meaning of several words contain$the explanation 
of the cognitive relation for Alexander. Most important is 
compresence, which he considered the most elementary of all 
relations. All things that exist in time and space are, in 
a sense, together and in this relation of being together 
knowledge is possible. 1 In the relationship, compresence, 
knowledge is not unique, but like the simplest of all rela-
tions, "for all that knowledge as such implies is the com-
presence of a mind and an object .at a lower level."2 
But with the simple relation of compresence the sim-
' plicity of the cognitive relation ends. Knowledge involves 
the compresence of two distinct existences which may be 
called mind and object for the case of human cognition. 
Problems are immediately encountered. 
The following questions must be asked: l) What evi-
dence shows that compresence and the cognitive relation con-
nect• two distinct existences? 2) How could mind know that 
the object is of a different level or a different kind of 
1. For the realist there is no possibility of knowledge of 
something that does not exist (where there is no rela-
tion of compresence). 
2. STD, II, 102. 
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being? 3) If for the cognitive relation it can be assumed 
that mind and object are of distinct orders, how is know-
ledge, one of the other, possible? To answer these questions 
Alexander employs the terms enjoyment and contemplation. 
"The mind enjoys itself and contemplates its objects."1 
In compresence things are experienced differently; 
the windows of things are glazed differently. Therefore, 
Alexander reasons, the mind enjoys itself or lives through 
its own mental states and the object is contemplated or re-
ferred to as that which is known. Thus, he preserved the 
dualism of the knowing situation as we experience it. Human 
knowledge is always of something. 
But Alexander does not explain how mind can have 
knowledge of an object in terms of knowledge theory alone. 
His theory of knowledge is derived from his theory of being 
and is dependent on it. Mind enjoys itself and contemplates 
its objects because minds. and objects are two different levels 
of existence. Furthermore, he holoothat knowing and the 
known~ distinctly different because mind experiences non-
mental objects~2 
ii.. The Subject-Object Relation 
A distinguishing mark of realism, that the object is 
independent of the mind, is stressed by Alexander. He op-
poses "those who seek in something like mind for what is 
1. STD, I, 12. 
2. STD, I, 16. 
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1 fundamental in things." The danger he intended to avoid 
is anthropomorphism, that man in the knowing process should 
be taken as the clue to things. 
Alexander recognized the selective activity of the 
mind necessary for subject-object distinction. It follows 
from the relation of compresence in which all finites are 
connected that selectivity is necessary for any kind of speci-
fic knowledge. But, says Alexander, "this selectiveness of 
the mind induces the belief that the objects of mind are 
made by it."2 This is the tendency of idealism that he would 
refute. 
If anything is apparent about the knowing situation 
it is that mind has knowledge of or refers to an object. 
Alexander recognized and asserted an epistemic dualism. But 
from this point he carried his reasoning a step farther by 
asserting a metaphysical postulate. If the idealist com-
mitted a fallacy in using the mind as the measure of things, 
Alexander committed a fallacy of equal import by claiming 
that "my experience declares the distinct existence of the 
object as something non-mental. 113 If the idealist commits 
a fallacy by claiming the object to exist in the form of 
idea, Alexander commits the same fallacy by claiming the 
nature of the object to be non-mental. The fallacy is in-
itial predication; an assertion is made about something by 
l. BFOV, 299. 
2. STD, I, 15. 
3. STD, I, 16. 
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the use of the grammatical context}·~the object is non-mental. 
If this fallacy is to be avoided the inquirer should begin 
by stating that the nature of what is referred to (object) 
is x. Then, as evidence which discloses the nature of the 
object is found, statements about the nature of the object 
may be made. 
In the complete knowledge theory held by Alexander 
there is a division into distinct kinds of knowing because 
there are distinct levels of existents and distinct quali-
1 
ties. He refers to the experience of mere knowing, the 
common knowledge of things and facts, in contrast to the 
2 
knowledge of values or tertiary qualities. The distinc-
tion between common knowledge and knowledge of value is 
pointed to in the following qualification of value as a 
tertiary quality: 
The tertiary qualities LValue~ are not ob-jective like secondary ones, nor peculiar to 
mind and thus subjective like consciousness, 
nor are they like the primary qualities com-
mon both to subjects and objects. They are 
subject-object determinations.j 
In the statement above, Alexander finds value to be 
derived, like common knowledge, in subject-object relation. 
A mind has knowledge of something called value. But a dif-
ficulty is detected as he tries to distinguish knowledge of 
value from other knowledge. For in holding tertiary quali-
1. These distinct levels and qualities are metaphysical 
components of an emergence hypothesis. 
2. STD, II, 23e. 
3. STD, II, 238. 
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n 
ties to be subject-object determinations, he seems to have 
given up the stressed distinction he made between mind and 
object in the knowing situation. 1 
iii. Appearance and Value 
The philosopher who is interested in the problems 
of knowledge finds a profitable area of investigation in ex-
amining the appearance of things. Things appear differently 
under different conditions. The mistaking of appearance is 
a common experience. Because of the selective activity of 
the mind, what is taken to be an object is often mere appear-
ance. When examined closely from a different viewpoint, the 
object may differ from its first appearance. Both illusion 
and error arise in perception with the appearance of things. 
Alexander classified appearances as l) real appear-
ance, 2) mere appearance, and 3) illusory appearance. 2 
Standardized or normal minds will apprehend different 
real appearances of the thing in virtue of their position 
relatively to it in place and time.3 It is assumed that in 
real appearance a distinction can be made between the place 
where a thing appears to be and its actual place in space-
time. That real appearance according to the definition could 
be 
he 
1. 
2. 
3. 
a knowledge experience, Alexander did not question because 
asserted the possibility of direct knowledge of reality 
A more careful development of value experience as sub-
ject-object determination will follow. 
STD, II, 184, 185, 186. 
STD, II, 184. 
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as the distinct existence of an objective world which is 
non-mental. But even the possibility of such direct experi-
ence had to be qualified; it was held to be only for the 
standardized or normal mind, a distinction he did not make 
explicit except for his explanation of the standard mind 
in his chapter on value in STD. 1 
Mere appearance is due to the combination of the 
thing with other things, 2 i.e., the setting sun with the 
distortion caused by air conditions producing refracted rays 
and brilliant colors. According to Alexander, mere appear-
ance is strictly an objective phenomenon. To state this pro-
position another way, the objective world is a world of fused 
objects awaiting the selective activity of mind. 
Though he is not explicit at this point, it may be 
assumed that mere appearance, like his designation mere know-
ledge, is the common knowledge experience. For, certainly, 
real appearance with its direct veridical knowledge is not 
the common knowledge experience, nor is the knower generally 
the victim of illusion. 
Illusory appearance arises from the intrusion of the 
mind of the observer into the observation.3 Why Alexander 
selected this type of knowledge experience as initiated by 
the so-called intrusion of the mind is not clear, except that 
illusion in experience seems to be of a mental character. 
It seems more reasonable to say that the mind has not perceived 
1. To be analyzed in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
2. STD, II, 184. 
3. STD, II, 184. 
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the object correctly rather than to say that the object is 
playing tricks on us. 
The intrusion of the mind causing illusory appear-
ance Alexander qualified as always implying 11 omission or ad-
dition or distortion owing to the abnormality of the perci-
pient.111 Concerning his reference to the abnormality of 
the percipient and later, to "a mind in abnormal condition,"2 
questions may be raised. Since illusory appearance is a com-
mon experience, are all minds that experience the same ab-
normal? Or, are minds abnormal in experience of illusory 
appearances only? Hc·w could an abnormal mind distinguish 
illusory appearance? 
The previous discussion of appearance has been neces-
sary because Alexander made a definite connection between il-
lusory appearance and value. He realized that the study of 
the appearance of things had brought him to the distinction 
of truth and error. Recall that illusory objects were held 
to be real (non-mental), but illusion is unreal in the sense 
that it is untrue, "though like any error it is perfectly 
real when taken along with the mind which possesses it."3 
At this point he makes the interesting connection, 
Illusions therefore introduce us to the sub-
ject of values; they are unreal as being un-
true, and unreconcileable in their illusory 
form with the whole world of reality.4 
1. STD, II, 185. Italics mine. 
2. STD, II, 213. 
3. STD, II, 217. 
4. STD, II, 217. 
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In simple terms, what Alexander seems to be saying 
is that values like illusions are different from common know-
ledge experience. Both illusion and value~ though founded 
in reality~ have the mark of the unreal on them because of 
a kind of intrusion by the mind. Alexander made the com-
parison of illusion and value because, in the experience of 
both, mind is introduced to the object in such a way as to 
cause a kind of distortion. A valued object is observed for 
its own sake; the result is a unique experience in which 
reality in its usually observed form takes on the aspect of 
the unreal. 
This question remains to be asked of Alexander; if 
values are unreconcilable in any form with the world of real-
ity, is there an irrational element in value experience? In 
his comparison of illusion and value he left himself in dan-
ger of being misunderstood. 
4. A Realistic System 
A realistic approach to the problems of philosophy 
was the method Alexander used. Points of his early realism 
have been previously cited. The aim of realism is to see 
things as they really are with bias and prejudice eliminated. 
For the realist, value cannot be taken as a clue to the real; 
this may be a mental bias. 
Alexander attempted to see things realistically as 
he systematized his thought in STD. One of his main concerns 
was to show that the importance of man and mind is not 
19 
supreme. He insisted that minds are just "the most gifted 
members known to us in a democracy of things." 1 Mind and 
value for AlexanderJs realistic system are not to be thought 
of as unique, but as having their parallels in the world be-
low the human level. His purpose in treating mind and value 
realistically was a worthy effort to make both more intelli-
gible. Nevertheless, with his regard for the empirical treat-
ment of things, Alexander began the work, STD, with a meta-
physical premise. 
i. The Basic Continuum 
A system of levels implies a series with one level 
basic to all. This Alexander chose to be the hypothetical 
Space-Time as described in the following paragraph: 
The simplest being is Space-Time itself, and 
... material things are but modes of this 
one simple being, finite complexes of Space-
Time or motion, dowered with the qualities 
which2are familiar to us in sensible experi-ence. 
His metaphysics is an exposition of the quoted hypothesis. 
The basic continuum, the medium in which things and 
events are precipitated and crystallized, the stuff of exis-
tence is Space-Time, according to Alexander.3 For, in his 
thinking, the combination of Space and Time answered some 
basic problems. 
First, the problem of the relation of things and 
1. STD, I, 6. 
2 • STD, I, l 72 • 
3. STD, I, 38. 
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events in space and time may be solved if Space-Time con-
stituents have the inherent relational character of Space-
Time.1 
There is also found in the concept of Space-Time a 
possible answer to the problem of identity in diversity. 
As rendered by thought (in abstraction), time as merely tem-
poral is a mere now, and space as merely spatial is a blank~ 
But taken in their interdependence, space supplies time with 
a needed continuum, and time supplies space with needed suc-
cession.2 
This continuum, Space-Time, it is assumed, can pro-
vide the ground for all existents in all degrees of complex-
ity including value. 
In keeping with a realistic approach Alexander began 
his investigation (STD) by subscribing to an empirical me-
thod; it is of question whether he maintained the approach 
consistently. For example, he stated that 11 a world is cap-
able of contemplation by us .•. which is anterior to quali-
ties and contains nothing else but Space and Time."3 But 
if such a world is known, it is known only through imagina-
tion and conception in abstraction, and as such this world 
is fashioned or interpreted by mind. 
Alexander realized that conceived separately, space 
and time are abstractions and do not exist as such. Then, 
1. This point will be elaborated in the discussion of the 
category of relation to follow. 
2. STD, I, 46, 47. 
3. STD~ I~ 38, 39. 
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he concluded that because of their inherent natures, taken 
• 
together, space and time become the stuff of existence, the 
ground of concretion. In his words, "each of these elements 
\ · i}Pace and ti~ is concrete, and is only an abstraction 
when it is supposed to exclude the other. "1 · 
But it remains a question whether space and time 
taken together or separately is not abstraction, for they 
are reached only by a thinking mind;2 space and time are 
not known initially as concrete. For who has ever had an 
experience of bare Space-Time? 
This abstractly arrived-at continuum, Space-Time, is 
presented in STD as the generator of all things on all levels 
including value. Among the requirements that this hypothe-
tical ground for being must fill is an adequate theory of 
potential. Closely related to value is the idea of potential, 
for all value is a grasping of possibility, the action of 
forms of being which conform to some standard of excellence. 
It is certain that Alexander had given thought to 
the matter of potentiality. Each level of existence he con-
sidered a potential to produce the next higher level of qual-
ity; once a level of quality emerged, it was potential for 
succeeding levels. But he made no attempt to explain how the 
actual could also be regarded as potential. 
In fact, the concept of potentiality was a real ~oblem 
1. STD, I, 204. 
2. In at least one case, in the experience of subjective 
time, time is known partially on the terms of mind as 
conditioned by the organism. 
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for Alexander's system. Space-Time he regarded as a plenum,l 
always full. Within the totality potential is only realized 
in the redistribution of instants of time among points of 
space. 2 This view of potentiality on his naturalistic basis 
is little more than a system of relations scarcely capable 
of explaining the degree of complexity reached in maintain-
ing a standard of excellence in moral conduct or aesthetic 
experience. 
Any discussion of Space-Time is incomplete without 
mention of mental and physical Space-Time. In Alexander's 
system the distinction was necessary because of the epistemic 
formula, the mind enjoys itself in mental Space-Time and con-
templates physical (objective) Space-Time. A related ques-
tion may be raised at this point: what is the relation of 
the mind to the body in this enjoyment-contemplation, mental-
physical Space-Time context? The answer holds significance 
for the examined value theory. 
ii. The Mind-Body Relation 
For the realist, little attention is given to the 
individual person or agent as such. To do so would give un-
due importance to man; this is the proposed fault of ideal-
ism. Instead of a personal context for mental activity, 
Alexander discusses mind as a union of experiences of syn-
thesis of mental acts.3 And mind is always related to its 
1. STD, I, 65. 
2. STD, I, 63. 
3. STD, I, 14. 
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counterpart, neural process, for mind is a quality which 
exists at a level of physiological complexity. 
There is abundant experiential evidence for the 
point made by Alexander, that mind requires a physiological 
structure of adequate complexity in order to exist. But a 
real problem, for which there are only unverified answers, 
is met at the point of the relation between mind and the 
neural process or brain. 
The effect of the body on the mind in terms of alert-
ness is common experience. There seems to be an evident 
causal relation between the mind and the body; at times, 
sheer mental activity seems to press the body to unusual ends. 
But how do these two essentially different components of per-
sonal existence react together? 
Alexander held that mind was dependent upon neural 
process. Then, he proceeded to the conclusion of this state-
ment: '~e are forced .•• to go beyond the mere correlation 
of the mental with these neural processes and to identify 
them. "1 But why are we thus forced? 
Alexander was forced to identify mind and brain be-
cause of certain postulates of his system. He claimed a 
kind of identity for Space and Time. "Space and its Time 
are not two things but one, and there is no Space without 
Time and no Time without Space."2 He identified Space and 
Time because one seems to demand the other; we can conceive 
1. STD, II, 4. 
2. STD, II, 39. 
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of them separately only by abstraction. To be consistent 
within his system, Alexander identifies mind and neural pro-
cess because they are Space-Time constituents. He realizes, 
also, that within conscious experience mind cannot be dis-
tinguished from neural process. 
The mind-body relation can be traced in another way 
through Alexander's system. He states that "the world as a 
whole and each of its parts is built on the model with which 
we are familiar in ourselves as persons, that is as union of 
mind and body."1 He is quick to guard against the accusation 
that he has construed things after the pattern of mind-body 
by claiming that things follow a universal pattern found in 
Space-Time itself. Analogously, he states, "Time is the mind 
of Space and Space is the body of Time. 112 
The mind-body relation is, for Alexander, the old 
problem of change and identity recast. In this relationship 
he finds something which retains its identity through sue-
cession. Therefore, he analogously applied the relationship 
of mind-body to all parts of his system. 
Alexander's mind-body relation theory has implications 
which extend to his theory of value. 1) He saw the readiest 
means to the solution of the problem of quality to be found 
in the minding experience, for neural process, he held, gives 
rise to the quality of mentality.3 SL~ilarly, the complex 
1. STD, II, 38. 
2. STD, II, 38. 
3. STD, II, 4. 
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condition of mind mixed with an object of value gives rise 
to a new quality (tertiary quality), value. 2) Since the 
mind-body relation has its analogues on all levels down to 
Space-Time, there is the possibility that value will be 
found at the same levels. 
Alexander assumed a kind of identification of Space-
Time and Mind-Body. He consistently refers to the compound 
term, Space-Time. But he does not consistently use the com-
pound, Mind-Body. In his discussion of value experience he 
drops the Mind-Body distinction and refers only to mind. 
Having identified mind and body at one point in his system, 
he should have made some kind of functional distinction be-
tween these two components in the value relation .. 
iii. Valuation and the Categories 
Basic to philosophical systems the formulation of 
categories is a means of identifying the comprehensive fea-
tures of existence. Following the tried method of the meta-
physicians, Alexander is carefully concerned with the cate-
gories which he calls the pervasive or ~ priori features of 
things. 1 The explanation of the categories he considered 
to be the first problem of metaphysics after which followed 
the task of explaining empirical existence that stems out of 
these prior features. 
To be systematic in accounting for the relevant com-
ponents of existence it was necessary that Alexander account 
1. STD, I, 185. 
26 
for value categorially. If value exists, it is related to 
the categories and comes to be because of some pervasive fea-
tures of existence. 
The category of greatest importance for Alexander's 
system, though it is not emphasized as such, is relation. 
The categories themselves are begotten in the basic relation 
of "Time on Space."l And for the existence of value also, 
the category most important is relation. The unique type 
of experience occurs in the relation of a subject and an 
object of value. This descriptive outline of how value comes 
to be (in relation) will be supplemented later in presenting 
the full value theory being examined. 
A second category affecting the existence of value 
is order. Order stems directly from the relation of Space-
Time because Space-Time is orderly.2 Space, Alexander held, 
supplements the deficient characteristics of time, and vice 
versa, to give rise to orderly sequences. Order of a parti-
cular kind, coherence, he held to be a distinguishing mark 
of value.3 
Though the categorial features from which value 
arises are important, qualitied experience is more readily 
analyzed in the world of persons and things. 
1. STD, I, 189. 
2. STD, I, 262. 
3. At this point there arises the problem of accounting for 
disorder and for the incoherent. The system builder's' 
solution, as will be shown, is found within the context 
of the evolutionary hypothesis. 
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iv. The Extensive Continuum 
Alexander claimed the distinctive empirical element 
in things to be quality. 1 Quality is not categorial because 
there is no universal quality; there are qualities such as 
red and green, hard and sweet, life and mind and value. For 
these there is no explanation, he asserts, for they are brute 
empirical fact that must be accepted with "natural piety."2 
"Quality," he states, "belongs to things as mind or 
consciousness belongs to life processes of a certain configu-
ration."3 This is to say that ·quality (mind) is an emergent. 
In every case quality is said to emerge from a level 
of existence lower than itself and to perform the mental of-
fice toward the complexes out of which it arises.4 Thus, 
Alexander seems to have made significant statements about 
the part of empirical existence which he previously held to 
be inexplainable. His theory of value is dependent uvon his 
concepts of quality, because value is characterized as a 
quality. Value or tertiary quality is an emergent of a high 
order at the human level like primary and secondary qualities 
but not the same.5 
Quality and value are described in Alexander's sys-
tern as realities of the external world which emerge as con-
figurations of Space-Time progress from simple to complex or 
1. STD, I, 229. 
2. STD, II, 46, 47. 
3. STD, II, 47. 
4. STD, II, 67. 
5. STD, II, 244, 245. An attempt to clarify these distinc-
tions of quality will be found in the following chapter. 
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1 from complex to more complex. Consciousness arises with 
the human mind-body relationship. The emergence of conscious-
ness arising from the proper complex conditions, Alexander. 
claims, is the best clue to the emergence of quality. How-
ever, empirical evidence does not seem to support the claim 
that quality and (or) value always arise in the progression 
toward the more complex. Some qualities and values existents 
are such because of conversion from complex to simple. For 
example, a complex chemical compound in disintegration loses 
its complexity of structure while it produces a certain qual-
ity of taste. Simplicity is often a valued characteristic in 
life and art. In scientific experiment it is often desirable 
and necessary to reduce the complex to simple terms before 
valuable information can be attained. These are exceptions 
to the rule for the emergence of quality and value for which 
Alexander does not give account. 
Nevertheless, within his realistic discipline, it is 
difficult to seelwith what the philosopher could have.more 
satisfactorily related value than quality. For quality of 
some type is ever present in experience and the things of 
higher quality are naturally values. 
Alexander, the realistic naturalist, finds suffi-
cient evidence within the natural order to support his value 
theory. For him, qualities existents make up the natural 
world with which there is objective relation in a knowledge 
1. STD, II, 47. 
process which can be analyzed. From quality in the exten-
sive continuum to value there was for the philosopher only 
a short step. 
5. Alexander's Approaches to Value 
in Review 
The following summarized points comprise a beginning 
requirement for the understanding of Alexander's value the-
ory. His general approach or method was that of a realist. 
As such, his intent was always to treat a subject objectively; 
he attempted philosophical analysis without bias. He di-
rectly opposed what could be interpreted as a privileged po-
sition for mind and value: they were to be treated as equals 
within the objective world. Such were the guiding principles 
which led to these basic concepts of value. 
1) Alexander's first writing on the subject in ques-
tion was an investigation of the moral life. Realistically, 
he held quality of present action to be the mark of moral 
value. 
2) The discipline of science applied to value meant 
for the philosopher a subject for analysis~ capable of being 
understood. 
3) Value is knowable and understandable because it 
is related to the world of facts. This unique type of know-
ledge is derived through subject-object relation like common 
knowledge, yet differently; it is the product of amalgamation 
or mixing of a subject and an object of value. Being marked 
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by uniqueness, value was compared with the unusual knowledge 
phenomenon, illusory appearance. 
4) Value, along with all existents, stems from the 
basic stuff, Space-Time. It is, therefore, de-personalized 
arising objectively with the things of existence in specified 
relation. Determining characteristics of value are the cate-
gorical features of relation and order. 
5) The evolutionary hypothesis is basic to Alexander's 
philosophy and to the way in which he arrived at his con-
cepts of value. Types of existents, he held, emerge at 
levels with the required complexity in configurations of 
Space-Time. Life, mind, quality, and value have arisen in 
adequate conditions. 
It is not here intended to minimize the evolutionary 
hypothesis by pointing out that Alexander often used the hy-
pothesis to support his own assumptions. His procedure should 
have included more empirical examination of supporting evi-
dence for his own hypothesis. 
6) Quality (and value) were analogously understood 
to arise like consciousness arises in the mind-body relation-
ship and were assumed to be found, like the analogues of 
mind-body, on all levels down to Space-Time. 
7) The most prominent feature of the extended world 
Alexander found to be quality. He characterized value as 
both like and unlike this salient feature of things. 
The importance of value theory to Alexander's metaphy-
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sics and to his philosophy in general should now be evident. 
Some of the important approaches to the subject in his 
thought have been outlined. They serve both as tools of 
analysis and for proper introduction to the analysis of value 
to follow. 
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CHAPTER III 
ALEXANDER'S VALUE THEORY 
1. Value in General 
Eighty pages of Space, Time, and Deity are devoted 
to the defining of value and relating the defining concepts 
to the system. For Alexander's system such a procedure was 
necessary in order to arrive at identifying features of val-
ue for different levels of existence. 
Value at the human level, like the emergents of all 
levels, arises with a certain Space-Time complexity.l The 
human values (truth, beauty, and goodness), Alexander calls 
tertiary qualities to distinguish them from primary and sec-
ondary qualities. He insists that, "the tertiary qualities 
are not the only kind of values, though it is they which in 
the strictest sense have the right to the name. 11 2 Because 
of the possibility of finding value at different levels of 
existence there are different ways that Alexander defines 
value. 
However, one characteristic Alexander applies to the 
meaning of value in general; value arises with competition 
and adaptation of alL forms of existence. 11Competition is 
the means to the supremacy of the adapted over the unadapted 
1. STD, II, 239. 
2. STD, II, 302. 
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types, and brings value into being by the rejection of un-
value."1 Value does not, therefore, depend on the living or 
conscious character of a subject. Competition and adapta-
tion take• place below the levels of life and mind for "na-
ture· herself is the scene of ceaseless experimentation."2 
Having pointed out the general characteristic of 
value derivative from competition and adaptation, Alexander 
makes the following conclusive statement: 
The values strictly so-called, the tertiary 
qualities, are but the highest instance we 
know of a feature of things which extends 
over a much 11Jider range, and is found in the 
nature of Space-Time itself.3 
The feature of things referred to above is competi-
tive process. Alexander insists that competition not only 
explains how new types of existents are generated, but how 
they come to have value.4 That which survives and succeeds 
has value. In the contrast of adapted over unadapted types 
of being value is born. 
The general description of the way values come to 
be defines value for any part of Alexander's system. The 
defining aspects of value for different levels of existence 
may now be pointed out • 
. i. Definitions 
Alexander claims that the idea of value has become 
1. STD, II, 310. 
2. STD, II, 311. 
3. STD, II, 311. 
4. STD, II, 309. 
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the subject of so much loose usage and thinking that the 
word, value, has an ill odour. 1 WordsJlike tools,become worn 
with usage and lose their sharpness of meaning. For this 
reason, Alexander attempts to define clearly what he thinks 
should be the minimum requirements for the existence of val-
ue at various levels. 
The satisfaction of an impulse or need is a phrase 
used by Alexander to define value for a large area of exis-
tence. If an animal is hungry.food is of valueJfor it satis-
fies hunger. In the forming of chemical compounds a defici-
ency of one element is satisfied by another element in the 
fusion. A specific characteristic of value at the human 
level is that certain human needs are satisfied. Man has an 
inquisitive impulse (the desire to learn). The seeking of 
truth satisfies this impulse as the true is discovered. 
What is discovered to be true for a given situation has val-
ue for the discoverer and society. 
Human mentality and the social nature of man set the 
distinguishing features of human value according to Alexan-
der.2 Man is able to reflect and judge; his judgments become 
social because he has a language and can communicate ideas. 
Men hold conflicting ideas, but in society there is not com-
petition alone; there is also co-operation. 
Alexander offers these general definitions of the 
higher human values. 1) For every value experience there 
1. PLP, 287. 
2. STD, II, 303, 304. 
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is a subject and an object of value and value resides in the 
relation between the two. 2) From the combination of valuing 
subject and object a fresh reality (Quality) emerges. 3) 
The resulting qualitied experience is not merely pleasure 
giving; it is satisfying. 4) Satisfying value experience 
pleases after a certain fashion; the individual is pleased 
and society approves. 5) Value is of an individual nature; 
what is precious for one person may not be so for another. 
6) Value is also intrinsically social. An object which gives 
satisfying aesthetic experience is judged to be beautiful. 
But the value of the beautiful object is also determined in 
the clash of minds in the agreement and conflict of criti-
cism.1 
The following discourse of this chapter will be di-
rected toward the clarification and elaboration of the gen-
eral definitions previouslw given. 
1-:t. Value Origins 
Within the general definitions there is reference to 
the origin of values. The ultimate source of value, as for 
all existents for Alexander is Space-Time. His system is 
the tracing of emergents from Space-Time configurations·. 
From the stuff of origination it was necessary to describe 
how new emergents come to be. The basic example of an emer-
gent he found to be quality. The red book is red because a 
1. The general definitions of human values are summarized 
from STD, II, 302, 303. 
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certain combination of at~ns reflects light of the wave 
length which produces the color, red, to the visual sense. 
The cond·itions which give rise to the quality, red, can thus 
be explained but the emergent, redness itself, cannot be ex-
plained; it is simply accepted. 
The origin of human values, for Alexander, comes 
about in the relation between objects and mind which is sat-
isfied in a particular way. An aesthetic object is satisfy-
ing to an appreciating mind. Both real objects and appreciat-
ing minds are held to be necessary, for ltdthout minds or per-
sons which possess facts or acts there would be no higher 
values. 1 
In the process of human minds appreciating a segment 
of reality there emerges something which Alexander describes 
as unreality. Human appreciation, he holds, involves the 
modification of the real object in that it is used for one's 
own ends. Unreality is thus a term which he uses to describe 
the way in which value arises from the real as it is appre-
ciated or possessed by the mind. "Reality which belongs to 
the unreal belongs to it in virtue of its falsity which we 
shall see implies its possession by the mind, and always in-
volves judgment." 2 Alexander insisted that value does not 
originate with the mind alone or only at the level of mind, 
but that the human mind does something unique with a part of 
the objective world to cause the emergence of a new reality 
1. PLP, 247. 
2. STD, II, 225. 
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(value) which is different from the usual form of the real 
1 
and is in that sense unreal. The object of value is known 
differently from the usual object of knowledge; it is ap-
preciated. And human appreciation, Alexander holds, does 
something unique to an object so that it can no longer be 
considered the same reality. Something new emerges which 
he calls value. Another concept of Alexander's system gives 
an explanation for the way value originates. The concept of 
adaptation in the emergence formula is what he uses to des-
cribe the way in which value arises. 
Every finite is a part which subsists within 
Space-Time, and so far as it retains its own 
individual character it is accomodated or 
adapted to its surroundings in Space-Time ... 
In respect of minds, this adaptation to other 
minds which surround it and to the world of 
other things is the foundation of values -
truth, goodness, beauty .... Unvalues- error, 
badness, ugliness - rest on the failure of 
adaptation and consequent i~permanence of 
the thing in its evil form. 
From the above quotation it may be noted that Alexan-
der's theory of the way values come to be is derived from 
his thinking about reality (Space-Time) and a type of func-
tion in the world of things and minds. He presupposes a 
type of direct knowledge about reality in which right rela-
tions are known. He assumes that it can be known when some-
thing is adapted to its surroundings. But how can it be 
known when something is adapted to surroundings in constant 
l. Alexander uses the term unreal in a special sense to des-
cribe the unusual perception of reality in value experi-
ence. There is nothing unreal for his system; all that ex-
ists is comprised of the basic reality Space-Time. 
2. STD, II, 78. 
38 
change?! Within his system adaptation means the return of 
somethifg ~ut of relative isolation into participation with 
the who~e. How we could have empirical knowledge of such 
I 
a relatfon he does not make clear. Adaptation is more easily 
conceived as possible in the communication among minds. 
The adj~stment of minds to a real objective world is a pro-
r 
positiot well taken for a foundation of values. 
I 
~daptation is a process whi~h, for Alexander, sus-
tains Sfrvival and contrast; that which survives has the 
mark of.[value, the unadapted in contrast is disvalue. The 
survivi~g is the permanent amid change and that which sur-
vives h.s value in contrast to that which is unadaptable and 
f 2 
thus imJ?ermanent. Because of the ·contrasting elements of 
I 
the ada*tation process evil is co-existent with the good. 
i 
Disvalu~ is born along with value as that which fails in 
adaptatfon. Wherever value is, there is corresponding dis-
value. ~Whatever succeeds may always be contrasted with that 
which d~es not. 
I 
~t is common in ~xperience to contrast the good with 
I 
the bad) to compare things of worth with the worthless. 
I 
Value a~d disvalue, in contrast, come to be simultaneously 
in expe~ience. The moral act is most highly approved when 
I 
there i~ knowledge of contrasting evil circumstances. In 
I 
the sch,me 
value cte 
1. STD, 1II, 
2. STD, III, 
I 
I 
I 
of adaptation, Alexander sees that value and dis-
to be in the achievement-failure situation. 
78. 
78. 
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I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Value appears in complex shades of half truths, beauty is 
I. 
fused w~th ugliness, and the good is compared with evil. 
I, 
f 
I iii. Coherence 
the principle of adaptation traceable through biolo-
gical etolution of existents on lower levels, Alexander ree-
l 
I 
ognizedlalso at the level of mind. He saw a persistent ten-
1 
dency of the mind to bring unity to the data of experience. 
This un~ty achieved through adaptation between minds and 
things 4nd among minds became the characteristic of value 
he call~d coherence. That which is coherent is valued; the 
I 
incoher1nt like the unadaptable is not valued. Coherence 
is, for fAlexander, always apprehended in objects of value. 
So impoJtant is coherence to his theory that in certain re-
i 
ference~ the terms value and coherence seem to be equated. 
I 
I
, Value of the object, its coherence, is not 
something which is already in the things 
i themselves, but is born along with the act 
l of appreciation. Values are therefore men-
1 tal (and the tertiary qualities are even 
j human) inventions, though like all inven-
1 tions their mfterials are independent of 
I the inventor. 
I 
T~e above quotation may be interpreted as realism 
I 
I • because fhe materials of perception are held to be lndepend-
ent of tfe perceiver. On the other hand, values as mental 
inventiors, would be acceptable to any idealistic position. 
But Alexfnder commits himself to a position that holds ob-
I jects ofjmind not to be created by mind but discovered. The 
1. STD, tr, 243. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
objects [or mind he claims are non-mental. Mind as one exis-
1 
tent in fa democracy of things could not create but only dis-
1 
cover. !Objects of mind are held to exist independently of 
I 
the min~ in knowledge experience. But for value experience 
i 
the obje[ct does not exist apart from the act of a valuing 
I 
subject .1 Yet, coherence, which Alexander equates with val-
ue, he ihsists, 11 remains a property of the object distinguish-
! 
I 
able frop the act of the subject though not existent apart 
I 
from thel subject. 111 It is difficult to understand how a pro-
perty orl the object could be distinguished that did not ex-
! 
i 
ist apar~ from the subject. Such a position would not be 
consisteht with his basic realism. 
khat Alexander tries to do is to provide an objective 
I 
basis fop the distinguishing mark of value, coherence, which 
is realibtically independent of its being known. 2 At the 
I 
same tim~ he tries to assert that the coherence that marks 
I 
value islnot known outside of the relation of the apprecia-
tion of an object of value by mind. 
I 
¥hy is coherence important in determining what has 
i 
value? poherence is an important test of truth, but how is 
' 
it relat~d to other values? Alexander answers, "It is be-
l 
cause coherence satisfies."3 And in the satisfaction of an 
1. 
2. 
3. 
STD,1 II, 243. 
Alex~nder does not hold coherence to be the only dis-
ting ishing mark of value. The previous discussion in-
dica es that he held value to be characterized by 1) 
thatlwhich satisfies an impulse or need, and 2) that 
whict is adaptable. 
STD, II, 243. 
I 
I 
I 
impulse or desire he finds the general meaning of value. 
2. The Tertiary Qualities 
Truth, beauty, and goodness, called tertiary quali-
ties by Alexander, are for him the most important human val-
ues. Like primary and secondary qualities the tertiary 
qualities arise in subject-object relation. Human subject-
object relation is highly complex and at this level of com-
plexity, as with all quality, values emerge as a new form 
of reality. 
Throughout his works Alexander is aware of the nec-
essary complex conditions for the existence of value. Pri-
mary qualities, shape and extension, he holds to be attrib-
utable to the external relations of things within Space-
Time. Secondary quality belongs to the object; it arises 
with certain Space-Time complexity. Redness really belongs 
to the book, for a book is red independently of the knower. 
But tertiary qualities exist only with human appreciation of 
1 
objects. Appreciation, a new type of relation, he calls 
the amalgamation of subject and object. 
To explain amalgamation of the object with the human 
appreciation of it he says, "truth does not consist of mere 
propositions, but of propositions as believed; beauty is 
2 felt; and good is the satisfaction of persons." Except 
for human appreciation of the appropriate objective reference 
1. STD, II, 237. 
2. STD, II, , 238. 
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value of this highest type could not exist. Differing from 
knowledge of other qualities, the experience of tertiary 
qualities involves the appreciation of objects for their 
own sake. 
The differences which seem to separate the tertiary 
qualities from other qualities and would seem to make human 
life unique arises in Alexander's system merely from the 
difference of subjects. Different complexities are held to 
produce different qualities. Human beings possess minds among 
which there is competition which does not destroy life. A 
communicable language makes possible mental competition. 
As compared with the animal world, competition at the animal 
level destroys life. Values arise in competition and co-
operation which gives them a social character; they are the 
product of the social animal, a high grade type of subject. 
i. Truth 
Alexander's contribution to value theory under the 
subject, truth, may be found in answer to these questions. 
1) How does truth come to be? 2) What is the value of the 
true? He searches for the minimum requirements or conditions 
necessary for the existence of truth. He tried to point out 
what makes truth something to be sought as over against er-
ror or half truth. He tried to show why truth appeals to 
the human animal. 
Alexander has a ready answer to the question, what 
makes truth valuable. From a biological point of view, man 
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has an impulse or instinct called curiosity which leads him 
on. There is value in the satisfaction of this impulse.l 
Again he states that "the value of the true lies in its ••• 
satisfying the scientific sentiment and that value is ex-
perienced in the pleasure which this satisfaction gives to 
the mind." 2 
Central to any consideration of value for Alexander 
is the satisfaction of an impulse and with that satisfaction 
a type of pleasure is to be derived. This may be considered 
his personal aspect of value experience for human satisfac-
tion is intrinsically personal. The satisfaction of an im-
pulse is always subjective experience. 
But Alexander always balances the personal aspects 
of value theory with the objective side. Truth may be val-
uable for personal reasons, but it is also to be prized as 
a means to progress. As minds bring order and interpret cor-
rectly the objective world there is growth in knowledge. 
As error is eliminated man is carried on to a fuller compre-
hension of reality. 
In answer to the question, what is the value of the 
true, it may be well to point out Alexander's working con-
ditions in the truth situation. A necessary tool in the 
quest for truth is judgment. Judgment is most commonly 
thought of as a mental assertion about a selection from the 
the objective world in the light of certain evidence. It 
1. PLP, 292. 
2. BFOV, 232. 
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is difficult to think of a judgment as other than an act of 
mind which refers to a given condition or problem. But for 
Alexander, judgment is a perspective of reality containing 
an assertion. 1 Thus judgment or what is judged is not a 
creation of the mind. A judgment is an asserted perspective 
of reality and both 11 the pieces and their unity are contained 
in the reality. 112 
The end result of judging minds is mental proposi-
tions. Mental propositions for Alexander are the contents 
of the mind or 11 the enjoyment of judging. 11 3 These mental 
propositions are a counterpart of contemplated propositions 
which are a part of reality, and when true, propositions are 
in the real world in the places where they pretend to be. 4 
It can now be seen that Alexander's theory of truth is a 
part of his system and dependent on it for meaning. What 
he considers to be true is an assertion about part of reality 
which the mind discovers to be where it should be, in a right 
relation to other parts of reality. 
Truth and its opposite, error, may be examined in 
their relational character. True propositions are those which 
fit in a system or cohere, while false propositions do not 
fit and are rejected.5 11 The rejection of error is performed 
at the guidance of reality through the clash of minds. 11 6 
1. STD, II, 250. 
2. STD, II, 250. 
3. STD, II, 266. 
4. STD, II, 254. 
5. STD, II, 253. 
6. STD, II, 253. 
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As the quoted statement indicates, there are, for Alexander, 
two criteria of truth: 1) The configuration of reality, and 
2) the agreement or coherence of minds which perceive it. 
The clash of human minds establishes what Alexander 
calls the standard mind. This is not the overall mind or 
spirit of combined minds, but is rather a "symbol for the 
co-operation and conflict of many minds which produces 
standards of approval or disapproval." 1 Truth is the pro-
duct of the intercourse of many minds and is in a sense 
created by mutual confirmation or exclusion. With this view 
of the standard mind there is provided a basis for shifting 
standards as well as for progress in the achievement of co-
herence. 
Alexander holds that the collective or standard mind 
is necessary because one mind in one lifetime could not view 
things from a sufficient number of angles. But with many 
viewpoints a standard is achieved which becomes the basis for 
truth from the side of mind. And the standard is a flexible 
one as minds come to the scene of active judgment and pass 
away. 
For another reason truth is held to be progressive. 
"Reality determines which is true, but reality includes more 
than that part of it which affects any one generation." 2 
Reality that is known by true knowing is only a small selec-
tion from the whole of reality. There are therefore no 
l. STD, II, 241. 
2. STD, II, 263. 
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degrees in truth of knowledge. What is true is true for any 
given time or perspective. But there are degrees of perfec-
tion or range of knowledge.l 
It should now be evident that Alexander's theory of 
truth is dependent upon two of the fundamentals of his sys-
tem; the nature of reality and the way of knowing. 
Alexander begins the chapter, Truth and Error, by 
stating that "reality and truth are not identical, and they 
are differently apprehended by the mind." 2 If truth were 
known in the same way as the real there would be no problem 
of error. It is because reality is not known directly and 
correctly that truth and error become distinguishable. 
For Alexander the real is Space-Time as a whole. 
"Our consciousness of reality is the consciousness that any-
thing we apprehend belongs to Space-Time."3 There is noth-
ing in experience that is isolated, but everything is known 
within Space-Time. Non-mental Space-Time is known as objects 
are contemplated. Corresponding mental Space-Time is known 
in enjoyment. 
Before anything can be thought of as true, judgment 
or belief must take place. Belief for Alexander is simply 
the awareness that what is judged belongs to Space-Time as 
a whole.4 The awareness of truth "arises when we proceed to 
sort out our spatio-temporal objects into their groups."5 
1. STD, II, 264. 
2. STD, II, 247. 
3. STD, II, 247. 
4. STD, II, 248. 
5. STD, II, 249. 
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There are illusions; some objects are perceived erroneously, 
and some judgments appr~hend reality truly. 
What is judged is a fact or claims to be one. A 
judgment is more than mere knowing, for judgment contains an 
assertion. Alexander uses this illustration: 111 A's going 
down the street' is a relation which I perceive; [this is 
mere knowini}; 'A is going down the street' is the same re-
lation judged. 111 A relation apprehended within reality is 
perceived; a relation is apprehended explicitly with a "re-
ference to the whole of reality,"2 a perspective containing 
an assertion is a judgment which may be true or false. 
Alexander simply assumes that reality is known direct-
ly, that there are different kinds of knowing, one in which 
we simply know, and another in which we refer the object of 
knowledge to the whole of reality. There are different kinds 
of knowing because in the perception of truth or o£ any val-
ue, mind and the object enter a unique relation, ·chat of 
amalgamation. In the case of truth he refers to the union 
as possession of the object, mind blended with reality, or 
compounded with reality.3 
Judgment is different from perception according to 
Alexander, for a judgment is a percept dissected and recon-
structed.4 But. this in no way makes what is judged a crea-
tion of the mind. "The pieces and their unity are contained 
l. STD, II, 250. 
2. STD, II, 250. 
3. STD, II, 253, 259, 262, 272. 
4. STD, II, 250. 
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1 in the reality." This objective side of jtadgment Alexander 
calls non-mental fact or proposition or the objects of be-
lieving. But just as important~ he holds~ are the mental 
facts which consist of enjoyments. They are the judging 
itself or the contents of the act of judging. 2 Truth and 
error are possible with respect to enjoyed as well as contem~ 
plated propositions. 
It can now be seen that Alexander's theory of truth 
is based on previously conceived metaphysical and epistemic 
premises~ that there are mental and non-mental realms of 
existence and that they are known in the separate ways of 
enjoyment and contemplation. He is careful to maintain these 
distinctions with regard to truth to preserve an objective 
world not dependent on mind of which even truth is a part. 
For truth is not the creation of mind a~_one. "Truth and er-
ror are •.. creations of mind at the bidding of reality. n3 
Alexander does not assert an easy correspondence the-
ory of truth in which a mental proposition agrees with a non-
mental proposition. He holds rather to a coherence of pro-
positions made in the intercourse of minds and of minds with 
non-mental reality. 
A double aspect is to be noted in the rejection of 
error. Error is rejected at the guidance of reality through 
4 the clash of minds. Both reality and minds are needed. 
Reality does not exhibit incoherence, for Space-Time is 
1. STD, !!, 280. 
2. STD, II, 251. 
3. STD, II, 258. 
4. STD, II, 253. 
orderly, but it does not reject an erroneous proposition. 
Conflict and co-operation among minds is needed in order to 
dispel erroneous belief. 
Propositions are perspectives of the real world and 
when true are in reality in the places where they pretend 
to be. For this Alexander gives a simple illustration. He 
examines the simple proposition, "This rose is yellow." He 
reasons that if the rose is really yellow its internal struc-
ture is different from that of a white rose. But someone as-
serts that the same rose is white. The sphere of reality is 
no more than the color of the rose which is yellow. The 
erroneous belief accepts from somewhere in reality as a "VJhole 
the color white and attaches it to the rose. Then he rea-
sons that the error of calling a yellov.; rose i'lhite is made 
because of a defect of the mind of the observer in error. 1 
He sees that in these relations two new realities have come 
into being: 1) erroneous belief--the artificial product of 
a twisted mind and reality, and 2) true beli~f, which, as 
true, is equally an artificial product of reality and minds 
which suffer no twist. 2 "Thus, the proposition 'The rose is 
yellow' owes its reality to itself, but its truth to the re-
jection of the error, which takes place in the refusal by 
the true minds of the erroneaus one. n3 
It must be said of this illustration as an explanation 
1. STD, II, 254. 
2. STD, II, 255. 
3. STD, II, 255. 
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of how the true occurs that it is over-simplification. A 
simple statement about a color cannot be compared with a 
complex assertion about human conduct. In charging that 
error is due to abnormal minds or minds with a twist Alexan-
der borrows from this illustration in which the defect is 
evidently color blindness and no defect of mind at all. In 
claiming that error comes about in the combination of reality 
and an abnormal mind he has the further problem of determ-
ing what abnormality consists of. Certainly every mind that 
clashes with another cannot be considered as abnormal. 
Alexander's final criterion almost becomes a count-
ing of heads as he holds that true knowledge owes its truth 
to the collective mind. 1 He implies that the standard mind 
or collective mind is composed of the greatest number of 
minds which agree, while the victims of error are the few 
isolated cases. It is the coherence of the greater number 
of minds in agreement about a certain proposition which makes 
it true from the standpoint of mind. Thus Alexander makes 
no allowance for the isolated prophet or scientist who warns 
the great numbers and is later found to possess the truth. 
It is collective judging which determines truth from the per-
spective of mind in a given situation. But the majority which 
rules is not always right. The greater number of minds con-
firming a given position have the greater possibility of 
possessing the truth, but this does not assure the case; 
1. STD, II, 258. 
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they may all be wrong. The majority of people thought the 
world was flat for years. 
Alexander makes provision in his theory for the pro-
gression or growth of truth not in degree but in perfection. 
What is true is true for a given time or collective mind. 
But reality though determinate of what is true includes more 
than that part of it which affects one generation.l Truth 
increases in range or perfection with the ever-increasing 
adaptation of minds to reality. 
ii. Goodness 
Human morality as conceived by Alexander can be out-
lined as he compares this form of value with truth. Like 
truth the value of a good act is a relation in which an im-
pulse is satisfied. The value of good acts "is experienced 
by us as the pleasure of having our,social passion grati-
fied."2 In this empirical definition of the value of good 
acts another definition of value is assumed. Recall that, 
for Alexander, value involves the satisfaction of an impulse 
or need. He assumes that man has certain social impulses 
which he describes with the stronger term, passion. This 
social passion, he would say, is man's desire to live to-
gether in groups, in societies. 
Man does not live alone, but longs for companionship, 
to appreciate and to be appreciated. All of man's activities, 
1. STD, II, 263. 
2. PLP, 291. 
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then, involve not only his own desires but the desires of 
others with whom he lives. And, Alexander would insist, 
having human desires fulfilled with the right acts is pleas-
ing in a certain way and constitutes moral good for everyone 
concerned. 
"As truth resides in the union of reality with the 
minds which possess truth," says Alexander, "so goodness 
resides not in the bare satisfaction of appetites alone nor 
in the will alone, but in the union of satisfying objects 
and the wills which sustain them." 1 
The mere satisfaction of a desire or appetite does 
not constitute goodness for Alexander; the desire or appetite 
must be satisfied in a particular way. Man is a social being; 
therefore, he must satisfy his appetites in accordance with 
the wills of others. Goodness is not determined by a single 
individual but by many persons in groups and societies work-
ing together for the good of all individuals. 
Alexander recognizes the object~ve side of moral 
value experience; willed objects are important. Human will-
ing represents the subjective side of moral experience which 
is important also. The objective and subjective sides can-
not be taken apart. Goodness is produced in a union of ob-
jects and wills. 
"Goodness ••. like truth is an amalgam of mental 
and non-mental existence; is a new reality whose internal 
1. STD, II, 277. Italics mine. 
53 
coherence is its goodness." 1 The amalgam, goodness, is 
Alexander's way of stating how the union of mind and object 
produces a unique relation in which value resides. Know-
ledge processes are involved, he would insist, but a dif-
\ 
ferent kind of knowledge results in which the quest for co-
herence is satisfied. In the·case of goodness, wills cohere 
and fit into a system; they cohere because each one is satis-
fied. Those that do not fit are bad and are to be excluded. 
"Error is reality seen awry .•. so badness or moral 
evil is the same reality with which morality is concerned, 
2 handled amiss." Alexander added a touch of humor in illus-
trating this point as he stated that the surgeon did him no 
injury by inflicting pain to relieve him, but the murderer 
does wrong because he uses the knife at the wrong time and 
place without the sanction from the General Medical Council.3 
Reality handled amiss may be either sometldng done 
at the wrong time or place or some act performed with the 
wrong intent. In each case the consequence is bad; in con-
trast with a good act the result is incoherent because a 
wrong end is achieved. 
The good, Alexander describes as a system of satis-
factions of persons which is effected by right willing. 4 · 
sr.) J II, 280. 
2. STD, II, 280. 
3. STD, II, 281. 
4. STD, II; 277. Alexander uses the term will in his writing 
without clearly explaining what he means by it. However, 
a meaning for the term will, which is consistent with his 
system, is the urge or need to satisfy appetite or desire. 
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Only right willing for a given situation could produce a 
system of satisfactions which would satisfy the desires of 
individuals and the society in which they participate. Right. 
willing and the good are understood, then, only in relation 
to a coherent system of acts. 
Alexander sees that systems of collective willing 
change with time and thus what is considered good for one 
time is rejected at another .. But there are no degrees of 
goodness. The universal sense of good is that certain act-
ion would be required from any individual in a given cir-
1 
cumstance. 
Certain moral rules may become universally recognized. 
In certain cases the good seems self-evident. Nevertheless, 
Alexander would insist that the conditions in experience 
always precede the rules. Kant held that no exception to 
moral rule could be made without personal prejudice; for 
him moral law was necessarily apriori and not empirical. 
But for Alexander for all moral rules there are exceptions, 
and these can be made if the individual acts objectively or 
2 
impersonally. 
Alexander formulated his theory of good and evil 
in accord with the evolutionary hypotheses, "Morality is 
the adaptation of human action to the environment under social 
3 conditions." In the give and take of conflict and co-opera-
1. STD, II, 275. 
2. STD, II, 276. 
3. STD, II, 274. 
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tion of wills goodness forms a coherent system while evil 
is excluded and rejected. In the process there is progress 
in morals. With the enlargement of social relations and 
complexity of living there is constant revision of moral 
standards. 1 
Alexander's strong argument for a realistic inter-
pretation of moral value is that the will is always a will 
for something which is an object of the will.2 Moral value 
must be considered in light of the objective empirical side 
of the moral situation. Willed objects satisfy needs of 
persons. But since persons are social animals who live in 
groups, satisfactions must be organized into systems. Sub-
jectively individual needs are satisfied. But objectively 
they are satisfied in co-operation ,,.Ji th the composite wills 
of society. When good is achieved there is no conflict be-
tween the two, the self and society, for collective willing 
is the work of individuals in a system.3 
iii. Beauty 
The study of beauty is of special interest to Alexan-
der because he considers it the best approach to the "es-
sential nature of value."4 He finds the experience of 
beauty to be similar to the experience of illusion in simple 
cognition. It may be recalled that in his theory of cognition 
1. STD, II, 282. 
2. STD, II, 276. 
3. STD, II, 283. 
4. PLP, 293. 
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he points to a connection between illusion and value. In 
the perception of both there is distortion of the real ob-
ject. The experience of beauty is held to be unique as is 
the experience of illusion in cognition. 
In Space, Time, and Deity, Alexander begins the 
analysis of beauty and ugliness with what he considers to 
be the simplest way to understand beauty. He makes a com-
parison of the perception of the beautiful object with or-
dinary perception on the one hand and with illusion on the 
other. The following are the sigriificant points of his com-
parison. "As contrasted with the percept, the beautiful is 
illusory, but it differs from illusion in that it is not er-
roneous.''1 He recognizes that the beautiful is illusory in 
the sense that mind reads into the object qualities which 
in reality are not there. The muscular body of the sculp-
tured athlete only appears to have great physical strength. 
Alexander is right in asserting that the beautiful 
object "does not as an external reality contain the charac-
ters it possesses for the aesthetic sense." 2 In common per-
ception the front side of a tree may be seen and the back 
side supplied by idea. By changing position the same back 
side can be seen but the front will be supplied by idea. 
In contrast to the former illustration it is pointed out 
that the Hermes in the marble block does not possess the 
repose and playfulness and dignity that is read into it as 
l. STD, II, 287, 288. 
2. STD, II, 288. 
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it is perceived aesthetically. 1 Alexander marks a real dif-
ference between the aesthetic perception of an o.bject and 
common knowledge perception. He is consistent with his know-
ledge theory at this point in asserting that the qualities 
read into the aesthetic object are not there in reality. 
Yet these qualities (repose, playfulness, etc.) for his sys-
tem must have some kind of objective status, for all objects 
are independent of the knower. 
In aesthetic experience or the appreciation of beauty 
mind seems to do the one thing Alexander would not have it 
do. ~· At :. least a part of his analysis seems to indicate 
that mind is capable of creating an object which has no real 
objective reference. His position is clear at this point. 
In a comparison he holds error to be erroneous in being ex-
eluded by the real thing. In other words for truth and er-
ror there is a real objective world in which we compare ob-
jects. But, 11 aesthetic sembla.nce is not attributed to any 
real object outside the aesthetic experience itself. 11 2 
In further discussion Alexander points to two sides 
of the aesthetic experience. 1) In the appreciation of a 
beautiful object one part is contributed by the mind. And 
it is only through what is added by the mind that the beau-
tiful object has meaning or character or expressiveness. 
2) But the expressiveness remains that of the thing and not 
that of a creating appreciating mind. Taken together, these 
1. STD, II, 288. 
2. STD, II, 290. 
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two sides of the aesthetic situation Alexander calls "the 
paradox of beauty that its expressiveness belongs to the 
beautiful thing itself and yet,would not be there except for 
the mind."1 He does not mean to say that there is no real 
objective basis for the aesthetic object. Without objective 
reference to something non-mental, he would say, knowledge 
is impossible. All aesthetic objects have an objective basis 
but in the appreciation of them mind plays the more signifi-
cant part. For Alexander, aesthetic experience is dependent 
upon the mixing of mind with the appreciated object so that 
the value, beauty perceived; emerges. 
There are questions to be asked at this point. Why 
does mind fashion its objects in aesthetic experience (from 
given material), but in all other knowledge experience the 
mind merely finds its objects in reality? Can the difference 
in knowledge experience be explained by the descriptive terms 
appreciation and contemplation? · If the mind has a necessary 
creative role in the appreciation of beauty, could it be 
that Alexander has minimized the creativity of mind in other 
areas of knowledge? 
The activity of mind distinguishes aesthetic value 
from other values for Alexander. In the case of truth mind 
is the discoverer of the coherence initially present in 
reality. Any intrusion of mind only produced distortion 
and error. Goodness resulted from the conflict and 
1. STD, II, 292. 
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co-operation of good wills and the setting of these wills in 
coherent groups. Willing is also mental activity which Alex-
ander assumes is different from other mental acts. With 
mora~ity there is detachment from objective reality, but with 
dependence upon material objects for the realization of moral 
value. With beauty a different type of value arises~ for 
here an object is contemplated or appreciated for its own 
sake and in the cognitive process mind itself is mixed with 
the object, introducing into the object feelings of its own. 
The introduction of human feelings into objects which are 
in their material state not capable of such feeling caused 
Alexander to compare this type of knowledge synthesis with 
illusion. 
It was beauty which troubled the realist most because 
in aesthetic experience through inte~pretation and empathy 
man fashions his own world through what is objectively given, 
to be sure, but the result is a creative work of mind. 
3. Value and Deity 
It seems almost unfitting that the realist and natu-
ralist Alexander should find it necessary to postulate a 
theory of God to conclude his system. His explanations or 
descriptions of all things including values have been 
made in terms of the basic stuff, Space-Time, and its rela~ 
tions in unfolding complexities. The shifting realities, 
Time on Space, seem almost to be pushing emergent qualities 
into existence. 
6o 
The higher human values in each case seem to fulfill 
a need or satisfy an impulse. For Alexander, wherever need 
exists there is its appropriate fulfillment. He recognizes 
as fundamental the human need to worship something. God, in 
the broadest sense, is whatever man worships.l He recognizes 
also that morality has directed man's thought to some kind 
of God. Man has come to worship, also, because of the forces 
of nature. Alexander sees each of the higher human values 
as an avenue Nhich could lead a person to a theory of God. 
It is human need Nhich has led man to think of God 
' 
as both immanent and transcendent. Man in his finitude has 
come to think of God as a being who cares and is present 
Nith him but \'Tho is not limited, a being V'lho transcends 
all human deficiency. To meet this human need Alexander 
points to a distinction betNeen God and deity. "God is im-
manent in res·pect of his body, but transcendent in respect 
of his deity."2 The body of God he conceives to be the to-
tality of things, but his deity he holds to be the next 
higher quality. 
The relationship of deity to value is an indirect 
one. Deity is supported by all finite value, and as such is 
"in the line of value."3 But the words finite and infinite 
separate human values from deity. For, as has been noted, 
finite value occurs in relation to the opposing disvalue, 
1. STD, II, 341. 
2. STD, II, 394. 
3. STD, II, 409. 
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but for deity Alexander could conceive of no disvalue. Hu-
man values are impermanent, but from these there rises the 
quality of deity which, .in its transcendence, is permanent. 
The relation of deity to value becomes clear against 
the background of the evolutionary hypothesis. Alexander 
held evolution to be the very history of values, for "value 
is at any stage the distinction between what on that level 
is fitting and what is defeated in the contrast or struggle 
with it."1 But at the point of deity there is no contrast-
ing disvalue. As with any risen quality it is a new reality 
from its supporting conditions. Deity, then, is an emergent, 
the highest known, not of the order of value for which there 
are no degrees but of the order of perfection for which 
there is infinite possibility. Yet deity is supported by 
human values and by all value as, in analogy, mind is sup-
ported by the body. 
4. Alexander's Contributions 
to Value Theory 
The genuine cont.ributions of a man to the great 
store of human thought should perhaps meet at least one re-
quirement: they should be generally recognized as true. 
True concepts should stand empirical testing and be coherent. 
The f?llowing seem to meet the above requirements and have 
been selected from Alexander's treatment of value. 
1) Value, however defined, arises vJith the clash of 
1. STD, II, 410. 
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minds. What Alexander means by the clash of minds he does 
not specify beyond the idea of conflict and co-operation 
that takes place in social intercourse. If by "clash of 
minds 11 he means the analysis and synthesis that takes place 
in all branches of education and research, he points to a key 
factor in the achievement of value in the great area called 
truth. If by "clash of minds" in the area of aesthetic ex-
perience, he means the evaluation of the critics and the se-
lection by the sifting processes'which eliminate the poor 
and perpetuate the best in art and culture, he has well de-
fined the way in which man arrives at the beautiful. If, 
in the conflict and co-operation of wills, there is to be 
found the struggle of what is held to be goqd against evil, 
the control of individual impulses for the good of society, 
and the function of institutions for the betterment of in-
dividuals, Alexander has given significance to the way moral 
values are achieved. 
Though he borrows heavily from the emergent evolu-
tionist theory in the use of the concepts of competition 
and adaptation, nevertheless, Alexander seems to have dis-
covered a sine qua non for value in the clash of minds. 
2) Coherence is usually given as a criterion of truth 
or a necessary standard for the systematizing of thought. 
Alexander finds coherence significant for other forms of 
value also, because of selectivity and unification on the 
part of mind and the consequent satisfaction which results 
from this activity in experience. For example, aesthetic 
value may be derived from an object of natural beauty only 
as the object is selected from raw nature. By selection the 
mind holds the object in a connected whole, in a coherence 
of color and movement, serenity or conflict of forces, simi-
larity and contrast. The object is appreciated, in part, 
because it satisfies the human need to unify or make co-
herent. The finest and best which is prized by human beings 
having survived the give and take of criticism usually ex-
hibits this characteristic of coherence. Alexander does well 
to point out this satisfying quality of the valuable. 
3) The achievement of human values has been a long 
and difficult process involving many minds. There is mean-
ing for the hypothetical question, could there be value for 
a single, solitary mind? Alexander would answer negatively; 
for him value is of a social nature. As minds come into con-
flict and co-operation there are formed social groups and 
institutions. As the clash of minds is perpetual the chang-
ing of groups and institutions is unending. With this per-
petual change there are shifting standards of value both in 
time and among groups. But what determines value for a group 
at a given time is the collective judgment of the minds in-
volved. This collective judgment Alexander calls the 11 stan-
dard mind. 11 Human values, he holds, are achieved in the com-
plex interaction of the individual mind and the minds of his 
social group which form the collective judgment of the group 
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as a whole. 
The significance of the standard mind in determing 
what is of value can readily be seen as providing the mea-· 
sure of value for a group in time. The standard for the 
group at the time is fixed by collective judgment. Each 
individual judgment participates in the coherent judgment 
of· the whole. The·standard is flexible, changing from group 
to group and time to time as judging minds come and go. Thus 
standards of value are preserved along with inevitable change. 
It is significant to note that these contributions 
to value theory are mind dependent. At the base of Alexan-
der's system mind is given no primary importance, but at the 
level of human values mind plays a leading role. 
Alexander is consistent with his own thesis that 
truth is achieved by critic ism and exChange of ideas. He 
always welcomed the criticism of his contemporaries and felt 
a sense of achievement if what he said or wrote elicited 
criticism. His works are still worthy of critical examina-
tion. Material offered by several critics from differing 
viewpoints will be used in formulating the concluding chap-
ter of this investigation. 
CHAPTER IV 
CRITICAL REVIEWS OF ALEXANDER'S THEORY OF VALUE 
Critical study of Alexander's value theory is one 
measure of its significance. The views of three critics are 
now to be examined. Each has a different philosophical 
orientation; each begins with presuppositions. Thus perti-
nent criticism is focused at different points. Using this 
method of cross-examination is a working example of what 
Alexander meant by the clash of minds, the existential means 
of arriving at truth. 
1. A Sympathetic Position 
From a position of basic agreement, John W. McCarthy 
wrote the book, The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander. He be-
gan by affirming Alexander's realistic tenets regarding 
mind and value. He agrees that "realism strips mind of its 
pretensions but not of its value or greatness." 1 By pre-
tensions of mind he means the tendency of idealism which 
would lead to the conclusion that mind and its values are 
the most real features of the world. McCarthy gives credit 
to Alexander for placing mind in its proper perspective in 
2 
nature b;y not giving mind undue prominence. Both men agree 
1. McCarthy, NSA, 10. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 12. 
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that reality depends in no way upon mind for its existence; 
whereas mind is dependent upon the natural world (Space-
Time) for its existence. Nevertheless the importance of 
mind in the world it knows is still recognized. 
Both McCarthy and Alexander insist that the doctrine 
of evolution gives explanation for the emergence of quali-
ties~ mind, and values. Both agree that evolution is the 
"key which unlocks for us the story of values."1 Both re-
cognize the importance of evolution to a theory of value be-
cause whatever survives testing and wins out in competition 
comes to be valued. 
McCarthy's interpretation is correct as he points 
out that~ for Alexander~ human values (truth, beauty~ and 
goodness) involve a relationship between mind and the object 
of value which mind both creates and sustains.2 But, going 
a step farther, he misinterpreted Alexander by stating that 
Alexander stresses the notion of the value relationship as 
process.3 In contrast, the term relation is used more fre-
quently by Alexander. Value arises in a relation between sub-
ject and object of value. Relation is a key term in his 
system for all things come to be in certain relations from 
Space-Time through the levels of existence. 
McCarthy recognizes that Alexander thought of the 
personal aspect of values, that values are human invention.4 
l. McCarthy, NSA, 48. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 61. 
3. McCarthy, NSA, 61. 
4. McCarthy, NSA, 59. 
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Values are personal for Alexander in the sense that without 
the human mind there is no truth, goodness, or beauty. Yet 
value, in general, is impersonal for it can be traced analo-
gously down the scale of levels. 
The agreememt of McCarthy and Alexander continues 
through the treatment of truth and beauty. But at the point 
of goodness they cease to agree. McCarthy charges that Alex-
ander overlooks the complexity of the ethical situation and 
that he fails to treat adequately the relation of the indi-
vidual to society. The good man for Alexander is like Aris-
totle's prudent man, the coherent individual who finds him-
self harmoniously adapted to coherent society. McCarthy can-
not accept this type of two-way integration as producing 
morality; he insists on more individuality. He thinks that 
in practice both Aristotle's and Alexander's theories require 
a highly regimented state, and that loosely knit democracy 
would fail to achieve morality. 1 
McCarthy charges that Alexander insists too much on 
the social character of the good life. He suggests instead 
that the good life may be an individual achievement. 2 Alex-
ander makes coherence of wills the test of goodness, but Mc-
Carthy points out that a coherent system may be evil.3 The 
coherence McCarthy here refers to is the coherence of a single 
system, whereas the coherence that characterizes moral value 
1. McCarthy, NSA, 42. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 4. 
3. l'vlcCarthy, NSA, 4. 
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for Alexander involves the whole of reality in change, in 
the unfolding of time. 
For McCarthy, moral value is concerned with indivi-
dual desires, the collective will, and objective goods. 1 
These same factors are found in Alexander's treatment of 
moral value. Nevertheless, McCarthy's most severe criticism 
points to what he considered as an omission on the part of 
Alexander; that is, the failure to show a close connection 
between economic and moral value. In other words, McCarthy 
did not think Alexander had shown sufficiently the importance 
of objective goods for the achievement of the good in life. 
He insists that the will must have an external content, for 
"we cannot judge a vague inner morality which desires we 
know not what."2 To this Alexander agrees for he also holds 
the objects of desire necessary to the consideration of moral 
value, but his theory depends also on the coherence of wills. 
Because moral value for Alexander involves a harmony between 
the individual will and collective willing, McCarthy charges 
that he over-emphasizes the subjective side of experience in 
regard to the good. Alexander, to be consistent with his 
system, recognizes the importance of objects but he makes no 
connection between economic and moral good. This is the point 
at which, according to McCarthy, Alexander fails by omission. 
Perhaps, in the search for conditions of greatest 
significance for the existence of human values Alexander 
1. McCarthy, NSA, 39. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 39. 
overlooks the connection between economic values and other 
forms of value. McCarthy proposes the following connection 
to close what he considers to be a gap in the relation of 
values for Alexander: 
The economic relation consists of 
sitive impulse which is satisfied 
quiring of goods. Economic goods 
are necessary for the maintenance 
type.l 
the inqui-
~ the ac-
Ltherefori] 
of the 
From the statement above, McCsrthy concluded that 
economic goods are closely related to the notion of goodness 
in general.2 
However, his criticism concerning the importance of 
economic value st~ms from a point of basic disagreement be-
tween himself and Alexander. Moral value may be used as an 
example. For Alexander, this type of goodness is the product 
of the conflict and co-operation of human willing. In the 
clash of minds coherent systems are established for the mu-
tual benefit of individuals. A degree of harmony exists as 
needs of persons are satisfied. Objective goods are neces-
sary, Alexander would insist, to satisfy needs, but they are 
not of the greatest importance for the achievement of moral 
value; the objective order is of equal importance with wills 
that strive for satisfaction. Economic values for Alexander 
function instrumentally for the realization of other values; 
they stand midway between instinctive values and the tertiary 
qualities.3 Because of human reflection moral values are of 
1. McCarthy, NSA, 74. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 74. 
3. STD, II, 306. 
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a higher nature. 
McCarthy seems to hold that economic values are of 
intrinsic worth. He states that "if economic values are not 
secure, it is clear that there can be no human values of 
goodness, beauty, and truth."1 McCarthy thought the co-
herence of satisfactions necessary for the achievement of 
human value, stressed by Alexander, implied the easy accep-
tance .of things as they are. In contrast, he advocates so-
cial agitation to bring about a just distribution of neces-
sary economic values. Therefore, he makes the following 
charge: 
Alexander's metaphysical scheme of emergent 
evolution should have provided the basis for 
a more revolutionary social outlook, but un-
fortunately his economic views simply en-
courage the status quo.2 
The views of both men regarding economic value con-
tain relevant insights. Certainly the higher human values 
depend in a measure on economic goods. Basic needs must be 
supplied before man can function creatively as scientist or 
artist. And if criticism is not focused on the injustice 
of maldistribution of economic goods, many persons may be de-
prived of basic needs and some capable minds may never get 
above the mere supplying of body needs. But on the other 
hand, as values emerge in the conflict and co-operation of 
minds a right distribution of economic goods should take 
place, otherwise the moral standards of justice and equality 
1. McCarthy, NSA, 74. 
2. McCarthy, NSA, 4. 
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will cease to exist. 
This critical discourse about economic value repre-
sents the greatest divergence of thought between McCarthy 
and Alexander. The greater part of the work of McC rthy is 
aimed at the filling of gaps or the relating of concepts in 
Alexander's thought. 
:'.~-. A Metaphysical Examination 
With a guiding interest in questions of ultimate im-
portance, J. R. Cresswell wrote a critical review of Alexan-
der's value theory. His work is an unpublished dissertation, 
The Position of Value in the Philosophical System of Samuel 
Alexander. 
Cresswell begins as Alexander did, by comparing 
idealism and realism, but he took no stand at the start for 
either position. He _pre-fer's; to keep the following principle 
in mind: 
The truth of the systems (Idealistic or 
Realistic) must be tested by their success 
in formulating and elaborating a hypothe-
sis which meets empirical data amply and 
adequately.l 
With a consciousness of this scientific ideal Cress-
well attack2d some of the presuppositions of Alexander's 
system. 
Rational pursuit, Cresswell recognized, involves the 
discovery of hypotheses for which there is supporting evi-
dence. He examined Alexander's hypothesis of first importance, 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, 1. 
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that Space-Time is the stuff of existence or the ultimately 
real. He tried to amass all the empirical evidence that 
could be used to support this hypothesis. 
Cresswell could see that the qualities of a material 
thing could be thought away and that a thing in abstraction 
could be reduced to Space and Time. But he could not see 
how a system of reality could be based on such abstraction. 1 
He could understand that certain forms of Space and 
Time are extensively given. The awareness of Space and Time 
along with qualities is common to experience. He went so far 
as to say that Alexander may.have had some justification for 
his claim that there is apprehension of Space-Time simpler 
than sensation.2 But to go beyond these forms to establish 
Space-Time as the ultimately real requires conceptualization 
or abstraction which is mind-dependent. To accept Space-
Time as the ultimately real would be to accept that which, 
in a measure, is fashioned by the mind. 
Cresswell agrees that the selection of Space-Time 
as the ultimate stuff of which things are made has a certain 
contact with common experience. But to claim Space-Time to 
be the necessary ingredients of all experience, to make Space-
Time the substance of things seems to him to go beyond the 
evidence.3 In pointing to the lack of vital evidence to sup-
port his basic hypothesis, Cresswell indirectly reduces the 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, 6. 
2. Cresswell, PVSA, 12. 
3. Cresswell, PVSA, 12. 
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adequacy of Alexander's value theory. 1 
The appreciation of values, according to Alexander, 
is an amalgamation of mind with its object. And for his 
realistic system he cut both the object and mind to fit. 
The external world, he insisted, is basically spatia-tempo-
ral complexities, and mind also is spatio~temporal. Within 
the human body he identified mind and brain claiming the 
two to be the same thing with different functions. And he 
also classified mind as an emergent dependent on the body 
for existence. 
Cresswell objects to Alexander's identification of 
mind and neural process. He points to the fallacy of the 
identification in the following way: 
If two things vary together, it is natural to 
infer that there exists some connection be-
tween them; but to assert their location one 
within the other for this reason alone is to 
advance far beyond the evidence.2 
For Alexander's realism there could be no privi-
leged position for mind or values for they had the same com-
mon origin together with all things. Though he acknowledges 
the selectivity of mind in perception and in value experi-
ence, mind is essentially a passive revealer of reality. 
For Cresswell mind is "active and selective in such 
a way as to give the most coherent and adequate account of 
reality. 11 3 It is consciousness that plays the unique role, 
l. For Alexander, value is metaphysically dependent upon 
Space-Time. 
2. Cresswell, PVSA, 33. 
3. Cresswell, PVSA, Intro. iv. 
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for our approach to reality is through conscious experience.l 
"In mind more obviously than anywhere else reality comes to 
expression as a tendency toward an individual whole." 2 
The disagreement on basic points of metaphysics is 
an indication that Cresswell will disagree also with Alexan-
der's views concerning value. The disagreement with the at-
'tack on the metaphysical hypothesis, Space-Time and the insis-
tence on a more active role for mind led Cresswell to make 
pertinent criticism of Alexander's value theory. 
Cresswell outlined Alexander's treatment of value as 
follows: 1) The first condition of value is amalgamation of 
an object with a perceiving mind or human appreciation of an 
object. Cresswell saw clearly that amalgamation described 
a new act of mind which resulted in a new type of knowledge. 
And the new type of knowledge in value experience arose with 
the emergence of a new kind of reality, tertiary quality.3 
2) The second condition of value is found in an analysis of 
appreciation. Appreciation is not the act of a single indi-
vidual but the judging according to a standard imposed by 
society. It is social intercourse that produces the aware-
ness of the new form of reality, value.4 3) A third condi-
tion needed for the existence of value as Cresswell outlined 
Alexander's work is found in the object. There is a corres-
ponding character in the object that we are aware of in our 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, Intro. iii. 
2. Cresswell, PVSA, Intro. v. 
3. Cresswell, PVSA, 105, 6. 
4. Cresswell, PVSA, 108. 
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appreciation of it. 1 4) The fourth condition of value is 
the distinctive flavor of things, coherence. 2 In his dis-
cussion of coherence, it may be recalled, Alexander claimed 
coherence to be objectively present in whatever is valued 
in a corresponding measure to the coherence subjectively 
experienced. 
At the point of objective-subjective treatment of 
value Cresswell made his best critical contribution. He felt 
that because of certain objective determinations Alexander 
became confusing as he described value experience. For ex-
ample, on the one hand1 for Alexander~coherence is the objec-
tive property of the valued. On the other hand he states 
that "coherence and incoherence, though founded in reality, 
are themselves the result of our selection."3 
It may be true that coherence exists in the object 
and for the subject in value experience, but a pertinent 
question remains. How could it be known that coherence is 
objectively present other than through the experience of co-
herence or value? 
In pursuing the discussion, Cresswell regards the 
confusion between value as mental invention and value as the 
property of the object to be the predicament Alexander is 
led to because of his separate treatment of fact and value.4 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, 113. 
2. Cresswell, PVSA, 116. 
3. STD, II, 243. 
4. Cresswell, PVSA, 114. 
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The separation came about metaphysically because of his emer-
gence formula--at the proper complexity, human mentality in 
the act of appreciation, a new quality or form of reality 
arises. Epistemically, Alexander separates fact and value 
by calling knowledge of fact "mere knowledge," in comparison 
with appreciation of tertiary qualities. 
Cresswell challenges the rightness of treating fact 
and value separately and gives evidence for their close in-
terconnection in the knowing experience. In a field of in-
vestigation most dependent upon factual evidence he shows the 
relation of fact and value. "The adoption of an abstract 
standpoint appropriate for the studies of the several natural 
sciences is itself a value judgment. 11 1 In other words, the 
scientific ideal is a value judgment which has as its goal 
the discovery of truth from factual information. Even in 
sense perception there is "not merely the apprehension of 
bare facts," said Cresswell, but sense perception "is pre-
ferential in its selection and thus exhibits rudimentary 
value. "2 
The review of Cresswell's work to this point indi-
cates that he views Alexander's position with disagreement 
and criticism only. Such is not the case. For about the 
importance of value and an adequate interpretation of value 
the men are in agreement. The activity of mind is considered 
necessary for value experience by both men. The reason for 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, Intro. viii. 
2. Cresswell, PVSA, 92. 
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diverse theory and the main source of Cresswell's criticism 
is found in method of interpretation. 
The demand for a single principle of interpretation 
such as the metaphysical hypothesis, Space-Time, Cresswell 
felt, was largely responsible for Alexander's errors.l On 
the basis of this demand, Alexander treated value in a sub-
ordinate position with the result that the subject was not 
always given proper empirical examination or thoroughgoing 
analysis. 
3.. An Epistemic Inquiry 
A third criticism of Alexander's value theory, On 
the Nature of Value, by Milton R. Konvitz, is written with 
central interest in concepts of knowledge or ways of knowing. 
Metaphysical issues are discussed but the review turns about 
Alexander's views about knowledge compared with those of 
Konvitz as they affect ways of interpreting value experience. 
Konvitz is guilty of overstatement at points as the 
following quotation suggests: 
Our main line of criticism of Alexander is 
that he is obsessed with the noti.on of co-
herence, and so falls into the error of de-
fining all of the "tertiary qualities" in 
terms of that notion exclusively.2 
The statement above is unfair and not completely 
valid, for although Alexander finds coherence to be a general 
characteristic of the valuable, he does not define value in 
1. Cresswell, PVSA, 222. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 2, 3. 
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terms of coherence exclusively. 
Disregarding his eagerness to prove Alexander wrong 
at points, Konvitz makes an important critical contribution. 
He gives significant interpretation of the subject-object 
relation, a theory of meaning, and symbolism as these relate 
to value. 
The way value is knovm may be discussed like know-
ledge of facts, by analyzing the subject-object relation. 
At this point Konvitz begins his criticism which followed 
the lines of knm.rledge theory. 
In his interpretation of Alexander's position he sees 
that there is no class of objects that belongs only to the 
mental world. 1 The realist would obviously rule out such a 
view. For Alexander there is no independent mental world or 
realm of ideas; there is one world of Space-Time with mental 
enjoyment of contemplated non-mental objects. Even ideas 
are held to be Space-Time components. 
Konvitz finds that for Alexander there is a class of 
objects that belongs to two worlds (mental and objective)--
illusions, values, and unvalues. 2 He then asks why value is 
generated in subject-object relation, but no such analysis 
is given in the case of other qualities.3 
Alexander would defend himself in the following way. 
Common qualities of a thing are generated in the thing itself 
1. Konvitz, ONV, 30. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 30. 
3. Konvitz, ONV, 38. 
79 
and conditioned by its own complexity. Mind merely discovers 
these qualities in this independent existence. But values, 
though founded in reality, are the results of our selection 
and are born in the act of appreciation. Qualities are dis-
covered; values are human (mental) inventions, a compound of 
subject and object. 
Knowledge of things and qualities is possible in 
Alexander's system only in a specific cognitive relation. 
Human consciousness is a continuous enjoyment of contemplated 
non-mental objects. In other words, subject and object are 
always experienced differently; the subject knows, the ob-
ject is known. There is no possible way to stand outside 
the cognitive relation to determine what consciousness is 
like. But Alexander speculatively offers the possibility of 
a higher being experiencing both the human knower and the 
known objectively. 
A higher order of existent than mind, whether 
conceived as finite, what I have called an 
angel, or as infinite God, would contemplate 
consciousness as consciousness contemplates 
qualities of a lower order.l 
Konvitz holds that Alexander invokes the angelic view 
in claiming that knowledge of value resides in the compound 
subject-object relation. 2 Alexander acknowledges the unique-
ness of value experience as he describes it as mixing of 
mind and object, but in so doing he bypasses the knowledge 
1. STD, II, 104, 105. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 36. 
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formula essential to his system. But it follows from his 
assumed order of levels that subject-object relation would 
differ with the levels. Thus, Alexander argues that his 
theory of knowledge is derived from his metaphysics. 
Konvitz and Alexander disagree concerning one funda-
mental point. For the latter, knowledge theory is a chapter 
of minor importance in his systematic discourse about real-
ity. For Konvitz, how knowledge is derived is a subject for 
careful analysis free from predetermined views of the objec-
tive world. Epistemology is of first importance for Konvitz. 
His finest contribution is found in the discussion of mean-
ing and symbolism related to value. In the analysis he gives 
reasoned objection to Alexander's views of the directness 
of the kno·wing experience. In his treatment of symbolism, 
Konvitz shows that knowledge is of an indirect, referential 
nature. 
Alexander gives little attention to analysis of mean-
ing. For the purpose of synthesis he searches for the most 
general functions of terms. Meaning, fOr him, conveys ei-
ther logical intention or description of extension or both. 1 
The meaning of the word apple, for example, could refer to 
past memories of the qualities of an apple (sweetness, color, 
etc.) or it could refer to an apple in extension, the apple 
on the desk. Meaning could contain reference to both idea-
tional and sense perceived content. 
1. STD, II, 96. 
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For Konvitz, the theory of meaning above is super-
ficial. He proposes a view of meaning which, in basic pre-
mise, is empirical and free from preconceptions about the 
object. His first premise states that meaning is an "act 
of reference to something not in the mind."1 This first 
premise seems to describe a situation which is simple and 
direct. But Konvitz sees, with a measure of clarity, the 
complexity of the knowing situation. 
Experience from which meaning is derived, as Kon-
vitz sees it, is not characterized by directness of refer-
ence but the varied possibilities of reference. An object 
acquires meaning when it causes a person to think of some-
thing else in its context of relations. A thing in context 
means not only the object in Space-Time, such as a red 
light, but also ideas which include images, concepts and 
percepts. 2 For example, a wheel may be observed along with 
the thought of one or more of its many uses. 
The content of the paragraph above is transitional 
to a third step in the theory of meaning for Konvitz. Things 
and ideas are symbolic when they stand for something other 
than themselves. "Meaning is through symbol to the thing 
meant. Meaning is therefore a transaction in mind between 
symbol and object."3 The knowing situation is not reduceable 
to a simple subject-object relation. A reduction of essential 
l. Konvitz, ONV, 43. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 48. 
3. Konvitz, ONV, 49. 
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terms to a triad of subject {mind), symbol, and object are 
the necessary factors for the proposed meaning theory. 
Konvitz points out Alexander's inadequate treatment 
of meaning in the following statement: 
It may be possible to explain meaning as 
the mental correspondent of neural process, 
yet the meaning relation between symbol 
and thing will still be along lines merely 
indifferent.l 
What Konvitz is saying is that meaning cannot be ex-
plained in a simple, direct manner depicted by subject-object 
relation. But meaning is derived through symbols which may 
refer to first one object and then another. Poetry may cause 
a reader to refer, in thought, to a field and flowers, while 
a field and flowers may cause a poet to refer to them with 
symbols. The relation of symbols and meaning is a shifting 
scene. 
In an attempt to eliminate the uniqueness of human 
knowing, Alexander describes the cognitive relation as the 
simplest of all relations, the compresence of two things. 
In the cognitive relation knowledge occurs as mind enjoys 
a contemplated object in simple compresence. Perception, 
therefore, is simple and direct. 
Over against this interpretation of knowledge experi-
ence which must be supported by Alexander's system, Konvitz 
suggests a more empirical hypothesis. It is common experi-
ence to be aware of things on the fringe of consciousness 
1. Konvitz, ONV, 49. 
while having a minimum of knowledge about them. Furthermore, 
awareness of an object is immediate, while knowledge of it in 
the form of judgment or perception is secondary. From this 
empirical evidence Konvitz concluded that it is awareness 
that is direct, but knowledge is indirect, being sympolic. 1 
Konvitz presented meaning and symbolism with more 
empirical function than Alexander's syste1n would permit. To 
• I 
complete his work he applied the results of meaning analysis 
to the value categories, truth, beauty, and goodness. 
Konvitz charges that Alexander uses two tests of 
truth. He claims that on the one hand the test is systema-
tic coherence and on the other it is correspondence of pro-
position with reality. 2 Then he concluded that, for Alexan-
der, coherence is not really the test of truth. 
The test is the correspondence of coherence 
among propositions with the coherence among 
configurations of Space-Time--th0 oorrespon-
dence of systems of3ideas with systems of bits of Space-Time. 
For Alexander, coherence is a defining characteristic 
of value in general because the human need for order is sat-
isfied by the coherent. Within his system he defines propo-
sitions as perspectives of reality. Using his knowledge 
formula propositions may be comp~red with the reality to which 
they refer, for both propositions and reality are known di-
• 
rectly. 
l. Konvitz, ONV, 50. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 109. 
3. Konvitz, ONV, 110. 
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Alexander defines truth from different perspectives 
without involving ambiguit~ as an object may be described 
from different viewpoints. In so defining truth he does not 
arrive at a single test or criterion for truth. 
Konvitz has confused the meaning of definition and 
criterion by assuming that the two are the same. A defini-
tion is a statement of explanation; a criterion is a standard 
or means of testing. The correspondence theory of truth is 
essentially a definition of truth; it is held that truth may 
be defined as correspondence of idea with reality. Coher-
ence is essentially a criterion; it is a working test of truth. 
To apply coherence as a test, ideas or judgments are compared 
to determine their consistency with what is known. Alexander 
defines truth in terms of coherence but it is not contradic-
tory to hold that truth must also conform to the standard of 
the coherent. 
The coherence considered essential to moral value 
by Alexander is an unsatisfactory test of goodness accord-
ing to Konvitz. He felt that the coherence theory is a psy-
chological, not a moral theory. of value. 1 What he meant by 
a psychological theory of goodness is illustrated in the fol-
lowing way. The coherence of a thief may make him a good 
thief but not a good man. Similarly he held that "coherence 
may be the character of the moral society, but it is not the 
2 test of morality." In other words, Konvitz recognized that 
1. Konvitz, ONV, 95. 
2. Konvitz, ONV, 95. 
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mischief may be carried on in a coherent fashion at least in 
a limited context. If a thief is systematic in stealing, he 
may not be caught. However, a thie~ regardless of how system-
atic he is because of his relation to society, is not consid-
ered good. He recognized also that what is considered good 
practice for one coherent social group may be considered bad 
for another. Therefore, he concluded that coherence alone 
cannot be the test of moral value. 
Konvitz preferred to define goodness as at least be-
longing to a system. 1 He did so to allow for coexisting 
ethical systems and also to recognize the critical voice with~ 
in a system which may be expressing a good that is part of a 
larger systematic whole. Thus he does not exclude coherence 
as a test but does exclude it as the final test. He saw that 
moral systems coexist but do not always cohere. And to use 
coherence as the test of goodness is to assume a kind of uni-
versal goodness. This is the basic point of disagreement 
between the theories in question. 
Alexander would agree that goodness belongs to a sys-
tematic whole. His general meaning of coherence is derived 
from the orderly manifestations of total Space-Time. As such 
the universe is on the side of goodness, and for his system 
coherence is a legitimate qualifier of goodness. 
Having shown the theory of meaning necessary to an 
1. Konvitz, ONV, 98. 
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understanding of value the following statement by Konvitz is 
unexpected: 
The good is indefinable; perhaps unknowable. 
This is as far as we can go in the analysis 
of the moral problem, and the result is a 
clash of systems, strife among ideals.l 
The critical remarks of Konvitz seem to indicate that 
he has a finer grasp of the complex conditions of moral val-
ue than Alexander presents in his system. However, the issue 
must be left here in the deep water of ethical inquiry. 
CHAPTER V 
AN EVALUATIVE SUMMARY 
The grouping of ideas which is to follow is given 
for the purpose of bringing the important points of Alexan-
der's value theory together for examination. Most of the ideas 
have appeared before in the body of this work. The ideas will 
be presented with the intent to answer the questions: 1) What 
is value for Alexander? 2) By what means did he arrive at his 
conclusions? 3) Are his conclusions about value adequate? 
1. Alexander's Method 
Every philosophical inquiry has a characteristic meth-
od or approach which is used in dealing with the problems 
at hand. For example, the investigation committed to a sense-
data theory of knowledge holds that there is nothing of sig-
nificance that can be known apart from sense-data experience. 
1. Konvitz, ONV, 101. 
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Therefore, following his working premise, the sense-data 
theorist can logically say that the metaphysician is talk-
ing nonsense, for the metaphysician works with non-sensical 
concepts or ideas which are held to be conceived outside of 
or beyond sense-data. On the other hand, the ideal metaphy-
sician, because of the method he ~mploys which is the attempt 
to synthesize every conceivable type of knowledge experience, 
can say that the sense-data theorist employs a restricted 
method, 1 that does not deal with the whole of knowledge ex-
perience. 
These two methods of inquiry referred to above seem 
to stand in direct opposition. The two viewpoints are of 
two different worlds of knowledge. An understanding among 
inquirers who are certain that their method is the.only 
right one is almost precluded. But, it must be stressed, 
both approaches are subject to the rigorous criticism of the 
same human reason that gave them birth. Both methods are 
useful to philosophical inquiry; one approach should not, 
therefore, exclude the other as being incapable of arriving 
at significant knowledge. Each method should be held useful 
for its particular purpose. A method combining analysis and 
synthesis is philosophically best. The sense-data theory 
in conjunction with logic may be used for much needed analysis 
1. The sense-data theory, it may be held, is restricted to 
one particular type of knowledge inquiry, though it is 
a very important one. Only that which can be empiri-
cally tested may be investigated with profit. 
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in grasping the finer details of knowledge experience. The 
metaphysician may take evidence derived from all areas of 
investigation and relate it in a significant synthesis. 
Alexander, in general, uses a synthetic, philosophi-
cal method; he is a system builder. He analyzes specific 
problems as carefully as possible, but his guiding purpose 
is to relate the whole of his thought in a coherent system. 
His concern to synthesize, to make everything fit the system, 
does not always permit him to be sufficiently empirical. 
For example, he presents his knowledge theory in terms of 
metaphysical relations (mental subject--non-mental object) 
rather than examining basic knowledge experience itself. 
He does not ask,first, how knowledge of an object is possi-
ble for mind or consciousness. He does not keep subject and 
object, in the knowledge situation, free from predetermined 
characteristics. 
Knowledge arises, for Alexander, in the simplest of 
all relations, compresence. He uses the term compresence to 
describe a relation in which one object is merely together 
with another and there is a type of interaction between them. 
At the human level a mind is compresent with a non-mental 
object and knowledge is the result. The mind knows and the 
object is known. Knowledge of values also is explained with 
this simple knowledge formula. Values arise in a simple sub-
ject-object relationship though subject and object are highly 
. 
complex. But, in experience, values are neither simply known 
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or simply achieved. 
The idea that value is always distinguished by the 
quality of coherence is another point of Alexander's theory 
that is derived from his system. Whatever is considered 
best (action, thought, or thing) in an orderly universe of 
changing Space-Time complexes will be characterized by co-
herence. Minds in competition and co-operation sustain the 
coherent and discard the incoherent. Discovering or creat-
ing coherence is satisfying and, in that sense, is valuable. 
Alexander does not search for more empirical evidence 
that would support his asserted relation between coherence and 
value. He seems to overlook some evidence that the incoherent 
is present also in human value experience. In works of art 
the incoherent plays an important role. In paintings the dull 
and drab contributes as much to aesthetic value as the bright 
and cheerful colors. The best musical compositions have a 
balance of the harsh and loud with soft, smooth tones. In 
life itself, the incoherent, that which stands apart in con-
trast with the status quo, often represents the valuable. 
The leader who dares to differ with the crowd may have the 
finer grasp of truth. 
Alexander tries to show that value arlses in compe-
tition and contrast between the coherent and the incoherent. 
But in doing so he fails to see that the incoherent also has 
a function in human value experience. The coherent and inco-
herent in the grasp of the unifying activity of mind contribute/ 
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to value experience. 
Metaphysical and epistemic contexts are confining 
limitations for Alexander's theory of value. Because of the 
scope of his systematic work he did not carefully treat 
every problem. Principles of evolutionary theory are used 
at points instead of empirical treatment. Therefore, ans-
wers to some of the problems concerning value are predeter-
mined. Nevertheless, he is able to make significant state-
ments which help to clarify the meaning of value experience. 
~. Notable Insights 
As a realist who sought the natural explanation for 
things, Alexander could not see that values have any connec-
tion with an unrealized realm of ideals. For him values 
are always to be found in the given situation. He gives 
the natural explanation that human values always fulfill hu-
man need. It is difficult to deny this general insight. 
The human being has a great number of needs and the ways and 
means to satisfy them for him become valuable. But a given 
need may be satisfied in different ways which may be classi-
fied as good, better, or best. With the fulfillment of need 
there are ideals involved for need is always satisfied best 
when the greatest possible or potential satisfaction is 
realized. 
Human values seem to be achieved only as the result 
of applied effort. Man has had to fight for the limited free-
dom he enjoys. His standard of living is improved by industry 
91 
" 
and hard work. An education or prized possessions are 
usually gained with hours of toil. What is won by toil and 
struggle comes to be appreciated. Man holds the achieve-
ment of the. diff.ic.ul t in·.,high regard. Alexander presents a 
related insight that value is born in the clash of minds. 
The clash of minds is the final court where value 
claims are tested and found valid. Struggle and work may 
bring personal achievement, but Alexander points out that 
what is to be labeled human value must be acclaimed as such 
in the human social setting •.. In the exhange of ideas and 
clash of minds man decides what is held to be good. The ideal 
society for Alexander is, therefore, a democracy -v.rhere the 
clash of minds is open and free, where the best is determined 
collect~vely by human reflection and judgment. 
An insight that Alexander pointed to with some re-
luctance shows the indispensable function of the human mind •. 
He held that without minds which appreciate there would be 
no value. Other qualities may exist whether a mind is pres-
ent with them or not. But the unique qualities of the value 
level come to be only as minds grasp and hold ideas or things 
and appreciate them for their own sakes. Thus, without say-
ing it, Alexander has intimated that mind creates the vwrld 
of values though the material for that world is objectively 
given. 
3. Conclusions 
Alexander presented a theory of value that evoked 
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at least three major criticisms and a numoer of critical 
articles. He did well to call philosophical attention to 
the importance of this subject. Though there is reason to 
hold that his philosophical method imposed limitations upon 
his treatment of value, he gave the subject generous con-
sideration in his work. 
The major criticisms have shown that l) points of 
his theory could be more closely related, 2) that the role 
of mind could be more adequately described, and 3) that more 
careful analysis of value experience indicates that value 
is more complex than Alexander realized. To conclude this 
work the following criticisms are added. 
1) Alexander makes speculative assertions about val-
ue without giving sufficient empirical evidence to support 
them. For example, he claims that value exists from the 
human level down the scale to Space-Time. If value is found 
at all levels of existence the meaning of value is essential-
ly thin. The meaning of value, to support the foregoing 
claim, he defines as that which. satisfies a need. Value may 
then be found in any relation such as common physical attrac-
tion or wherever one element supplies the deficiency of ano-
ther. Alexander's general definition of value is meaningful 
for his system. But to assert that value exists for other 
levels of being is to do so aside from human experience. How 
can it be known that there is anything like value experienced 
by existents other than human beings? 
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Alexander may assert that there is something analo-
gous to value for other· existents, but the assertion does 
not extend human knowledge of value and is, therefore, of 
little worth to value theory. 
2) Because of Alexander's search for a natural expla-
nation of value he fails to persistently ask pertinent ques-
tions about value experience. For example, he does not aslc 
how man has come to prize so highly an intangible such as 
• freedom. vlhy have the people of part of the world come to 
regard so highly the ideal of freedom? The ansv;er to this 
question is to be found in terms of the potential or that 
which is possible. Men long to be free in order to realize 
the greatest fulfillment of their possibilities. Free men, 
it is held, can achieve higher ends than slaves. 
Human values are closely related to the idea of the 
potential. The reason time is so valuable is because life 
is so short. To realize the highest ends of which a person 
is capable he must make wise choices and use of time. Time 
is precious because living through time involves the choice 
of so many possible activities. In the choice of possible 
pursuits a person succeeds or fails to realize his full po-
tential. The idea of the potential Alexander does not re-
late to his value thoery and the omission is a point of weak-
ness. 
3) The word competition stands for a concept that is 
essential to Alexander's value theory. In competition value 
arises and is defined; that which is surviving in competi-
tive process is valued, acqording to Alexander. 
Competition and survival are concepts which provide 
a natural explanation for a theory vlhich assumes that value 
is found on all levels of existence. At the human level 
competition is found in the clash of minds. Open discussion, 
critical review, and cross-examination, representative of 
"the clash of minds," are activities important for the achieve-
ment of human values especially for the discovery of truth. 
But Alexander fails to point out other mental acti-
vity, which is as important as the clash of minds for the 
realization of value. Much of the effort to create value 
is expended with no thought of competition, because the value 
is sought for itself. The scientist works to discover know-
ledge primarily to advance knowledge. In aesthetic experi-
ence the object of beauty is appreciated for itself. Moral 
value is found in the pursuit of the good life for the sake of 
the good. 
In so far as value is sought intrinsically, for it-
self, aspiration is more important than competition. Aspi-
ration involves ideals; the person who seeks to achieve or 
create ,value in life must have ends or goals toward which he 
works. The teacher teaches with certain aims in mind. One 
aim of a teacher is to start alert, critical attitudes to 
function within the mind of the student. The poet holds be-
fore him the ideal of expressing with words what he feels 
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in experience. But Alexander finds no place for ideals in 
his naturalistic system. 
The value of self-realization, the realization of 
personal possibilities is dependent upon aspiration and hard 
work toward goals. Aspiration may take the form of desire 
for education or wider experience. A consciousness of unde-
veloped areas of personal life may lead to corrective acti-
vities. A well adjusted personality like other human value 
experience is the result of aspiration and growth with ideals 
in view. 
Alexander's synthesized contributions to the know-
ledge of value experience have been noted. Where his theory 
is inadequate he fails to ask pertinent questions about and 
cite adequate evidence for value experienc~. Detailed analy-
sis of human value, the kind of value he considers most im-
portant, is lacking in his system. 
It will always be necessary to examine what men con-
sider to be the highest and best in experience. Vales are 
the guiding lights of experiences. Because of the changing 
scene due to progress and advancement of knowledge, value 
theory will be subject to constant revision as new evidence 
is discovered. 
" 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the investigation of Alexander's value 
theory is to present his most important value concepts and 
to determine how well he treated the subject. 
Certain questions must be asked at the beginning of 
an investigation of value theory. The following are repre-
sentative questions. How do values come to be known? How 
does knowledge of value differ from common knowledge experi-
ence? What orders of existence can be found to support value 
experience? Answers to these and similar questions are de-
rived from a theory of knowledge and a theory of being. 
Alexander answers the questions ·conc·erning value from · 
the perspective of a realistic naturalist. 
The source material for this thesis is found in the 
works of Samuel Alexander and in books and articles about 
his works. A primarily important source is his metaphysics, 
Space, Time, and Deity. 
In chapter two some of the approaches to the subject 
of value in the thought of Alexander are pointed out. He 
begins his formulation of value theory with an examination of 
moral concepts. The realist finds quality of present action 
to be the mark of moral value. 
Alexander applies scientific discipline to his quest 
for the meaning of value. He holds value to be knowable and 
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understandable because it is related to the world of facts. 
Within Alexander's realistic system value, like all 
existents, stems from the basic stuff, Space-Time. VQlue 
is de-personalized for it is held to rise with the things 
of existence in specified relation. Value emerges like quali-
ties, life, or mind with the require.d Space-Time complexity. 
Alexander finds the most prominent feature of the extended 
world to be quality. He claims that value is both like and 
different from this feature of things. 
Chaptertk~~is an attempt to present the important 
concepts of Alexander's value theory and to cite the major 
contributions he makes to this division of philosophical 
thought. 
Alexander defines value in general terms as the sat-
isfaction of need. Values, therefore,, may be found on all 
levels down to Space-Time. Value originates in competition 
and adaptation; that which survives in competitive process 
is valued, that which fails is not valued and is discarded. 
The mark of value in the natural world or ·in human experience 
is coherence. Coherence is the distinguishing feature of 
value because coherence satisfies. Competition at the human 
level involves the clash of minds. Value arises and is sus-
tained in the give and take of mental conflict and co-opera-
tion. 
The following are contributions Alexander makes to 
value theory. 1) Mental activity in the form of criticism, 
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analysis and synthesis gives rise to value in the areas of 
truth, beauty, and goodness. 2) Coherence is a distinguish-
ing feature of value because of the selective and unifying 
activity of mind which gives consequent satisfaction. 3) The 
achievement of human va~ues involves many minds, value is of 
a social nature. Collective judgment determines what is val-
ued and establishes the standards of value. 
Chapter ':four is a critical commentary on Alexander's 
treatment of the subject of value. Three critical revievrs 
are examined and significant criticisms are presented. 
John v'l. JVIcCarthy offers the criticism that Alexan-
der's value concepts need to be more closely related. He 
claims that Alexander does not see the. significant function 
of economic value. James R. Cresswell indicates that Alexan-
der minimized the role of mental activity in his treatment of 
value experience. M~lton R. Konvitz holds that Alexander has 
no adequate theory of meaning \<J'hich is necessary for an in-
vestigation of value. 
The concluding criticisms are given to indicate that 
Alexander treated the subject of value inadequately at other 
points. 
l) Coherence is not the exclusive distinguishing mark 
of value. Incoherence also plays a part in value experience; 
the morbid, the tragic, the incongrous help to highlight 
their opposites in experience. 
2) Alexander fails to show the essential relation of 
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the concept of the potential, the realization of the possi-
ble to human value experience. 
3) Aspiration, involving ideals and working toward 
ends, is not given needed consideration in Alexander's the-
ory. 
The giving of more adequate evidence for his concepts 
and more careful analysis of human value would have strength-
ened Alexander's treatment of value. 
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